4 CIR 229 (1980)


Unincorporated Association, |
Petitioner, |
A Political Subdivision, |
Respondent. |


For Petitioner: Theodore L. Kessner.

For Respondent: Leonard P. Vyhnalek.

Before: Gradwohl, P.J., Kratz and Wall, JJ.


This matter brings before us the dispute between the parties as to the constitutionality of the application of the CIRA, Section 48-801, et seq., R. R. S. 1943, to Class II school districts. We have jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of the dispute.

Agreements of the parties. The parties have agreed that all matters herein in dispute, except the constitutional issue, have been resolved.

Respondent argues that since it is not subject to the provisions of the TPNA, Section 79-1287, et seq.,R. R. S., 1943, that it cannot constitutionally be subjected to the jurisdiction of this commission. Respondent further attempts to buttress this argument by pointing to the provisions of Section 48-810, R. R. S., 1943, which prohibit the commission from taking jurisdiction of a dispute until the provisions of the TPNA have been exhausted - if such provisions are applicable to the respondent concerned.

We are unable to discern the trial of Respondent's reasoning through this particular thicket. The fact that the Legislature has chosen not to make Class II school districts subject to the TPNA is hardly a basis to challenge the residual dispute settlement authority of this tribunal over all public employers in the state. The TPNA is applicable only to certificated teachers in Class III, IV and V school districts. The districts are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to all other employees of the district during the entire existence of an industrial dispute.

It is well settled that the Legislature has plenary power over public school districts. School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass*'n v. School Dist. of Seward , 188 Neb. 772, 199 N. W. 2d 752 (1972) ("The Legislature has plenary power and control over school districts, including provision for the appointment or election of governing bodies thereof. Consequently, it may provide limitations on any authority to be exercised by a school board. If the Legislature has such complete control over public school districts, it follows, by the enactment of L.B. 15, Laws 1969, chapter 407, page 1405, it was exercising that control."); School Dist. No. 74 v. School Dist. of Grand Island , 186 Neb. 728, 186 N. W. 2d 485 (1971) ("The state may change or repeal all powers of a school district, take its property without compensation, expand or restrict its territorial area, unite the whole or a part thereof with another subdivision or agency of the state, or destroy the district with or without the consent of the citizens."). The classification of school districts by the Legislature is reasonable and constitutional. Stahmer v. Marsh , 202 Neb. 281, 275 N. W. 2d 64 (1979). The CIR statutes are constitutional. School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward , 188 Neb. 772, 199 N. W. 2d 752 (1972); Orleans Educ. Assn v. School Dist. of Orleans , 193 Neb. 675, 229 N. W. 2d 172 (1975); AFSCME v. State , 200 Neb. 171, 263 N. W. 2d 643 (1978); University Police Officers Union v. University of Nebraska , 203 Neb. 4, 277 N. W. 2d 529 (1979); Retail and Professional Employees v. Board of Trustees , 203 Neb. 829, 280 N. W. 2d 656 (1979).

The Commission has consistently applied the provision of the CIRA in cases involving Class II school districts. See, e.g., Bruning Educ. Assn v. School Dist. No. 94 , 4 CIR 138 (1980); Ohiowa Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 40 , 4 CIR 126 (1979); Orchard Teachers Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 49 , 4 CIR 94 (1979); Cody-Kilgore Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 30 , 3 CIR 254 (1977); Nehawka Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 103 , 3 CIR 248 (1977); Malcolm Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 148 , 3 CIR 14 (1975); Milligan Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 71 , 1 CIR No. 85 (1974). The statutes applicable in this case are constitutional.

ORDERED, that Respondent's objections to the jurisdiction of the commission are overruled, and the motion to dismiss arising out of such objections is denied.

Filed June 27, 1980.