| LINCOLN CITY LINES, INC. | | | CASE NO. 6 |
| a Corporation, | | | |
| | | ||
| Plaintiff, | | | |
| | | ||
| v. | | | TEMPORARY FINDINGS |
| | | AND ORDER | |
| DIVISION NO. 1293 OF THE | | | |
| AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION | | | |
| OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY | | | |
| AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES | | | |
| OF AMERICA, an Unincorporated | | | |
| Labor Organization, | | | |
| | | ||
| Defendant. | | |
Before: Judges Moyer, Denney, and Tyler
Editor's Note: On October 26, 1951 a petition was filed alleging inter alia, that in violation of a contract then in effect, in violation of state law, and during negotiations for modification of the contract, defendant commenced a strike against plaintiff; and praying for an order to preserve the status of the parties and terminating the strike. On October 27, 1951, plaintiff filed an application for temporary order to terminate the strike. Hearing was held on October 27, 1951, at the conclusion of which the Court entered its temporary findings and order, published below.)
This matter came on to be heard on Saturday, October 27, 1951, at 10:00 o'clock A.M. on the application of plaintiff for a temporary order, and the Court, having convened to determine what orders might be necessary to insure a prompt hearing and speedy adjudication of the industrial dispute alleged in the plaintiff's petition, and upon the said application for a temporary order made by the plaintiff herein, and the plaintiff and defendant appearing by their respective counsel, evidence was adduced, and upon due consideration thereof the Court finds: that a strike and walk-out is now in progress and has been in progress since October 26, 1951; that said strike and walk-out are contrary to law; that the public service rendered by the plaintiff is being interfered with by said strike and walk-out; that the former status of the plaintiff's employees which existed immediately prior to said strike and walk-out should be restored in order that the property of the plaintiff and the public service may be served and protected during the pendency of this action.
The Court further finds that the business carried on by the plaintiff is an intra-state business in this state consisting of the mass transportation of persons for hire over which the government of the United States has not assumed regulation and control, and that this Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this action.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that pending the final determination of the issues in this case, the strike and work stoppage in progress since October 26, 1951, cease forthwith, and the efficiency and continuity of the plaintiff's service be restored; that the parties plaintiff and defendant, and the plaintiff's employees, be and are hereby restored to the status occupied by each and all of them immediately prior to and at the time of the effective date of the existing strike and work stoppage.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending a trial of this cause the defendant, its members, officers, agents and representatives and all other persons, be and hereby are restrained and enjoined from in any manner interfering with or interrupting the efficient and continuous service of the plaintiff.
BY THE COURT
(On November 24, 1951, defendant filed a motion to vacate and dissolve the Court's temporary findings, order and injunction, alleging; that the Court of Industrial Relations Act was not applicable to defendant; that the Act was unconstitutional, void and of no legal effect because repugnant to Section 7 of the N.L.R.A., as amended, (in violation of Article 1, § 8 and Article VI of United States Constitution), and contrary to rights and duties conferred by LMRA; that the Act was repugnant to and in violation of Section 1, 13th Amendment, (involuntary servitude), and Section 1, 14th Amendment of United States Constitution. Also on November 24, 1951, defendant filed its answer, alleging, inter alia, the unconstitutionality of the Act under Article I, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 25, Nebraska Constitution: Article III, § 18 (7) (8) (class or special legislation), Article II, § 1 (unlawful delegation of legislative authority), Article I, § 3 (deprivation without due process) and alleging that defendant was engaged in inter-state commerce and therefore was subject to federal labor law.
On November 17, 1952, after oral arguments in which defendant objected to plaintiff's dismissal of its action, the Court found that there was no justiciable issue before the Court and overruled defendant's objections.)
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