19
CIR 146 (2015)
NEBRASKA COMMISSION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
PUBLIC
ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
Petitioner, v. CITY
OF LINCOLN, NEBRASKA, Respondent.
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Case
No. 1398 FINDINGS
AND ORDER |
Filed December 9,
2015
APPEARANCES:
For Petitioner: Gary L. Young
Keating,
O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, PC, LLO
530
South 13th Street, Ste. 100
Lincoln,
NE 68508
For
Respondent: John
C. Hewitt
Cristin
McGarry Berkhausen
Cline Williams Wright Johnson &
Oldfather, L.L.P.
12910
Pierce Street, Ste. 200
Before
Commissioners Pillen, Carlson and Blake
PILLEN,
Commissioner
NATURE OF THE CASE
On July 13, 2015, the Public
Association of Government Employees (“PAGE”, “Union” or “Petitioner”) filed
this action with the Commission, alleging that the City of Lincoln, Nebraska
(“City” or “Respondent”) committed a prohibited practice in violation of
the Nebraska Industrial Relations Act (“Act”)
when Respondent unilaterally changed and refused to bargain with Petitioner
regarding the days of work in a work week, the work schedule of PAGE Bargaining
Unit Members (“Employees”), the imposition of a Mandatory Standby Plan (“Plan”)
for 24-hour coverage and the creation of new 12-hour work shifts.
A trial was held September 10, 2015,
before the Honorable Sarah S. Pillen.
FACTS
The Petitioner and the Respondent have a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) in place that governs the period of
August 14, 2014 through August 31, 2016. The CBA contains several sections of
interest. Regarding hours of work and duty shifts, Article 18 of the CBA provides:
“Section
1. Eight (8) consecutive hours, exclusive of lunch, shall constitute a day’s
work and five (5) consecutive calendar days shall constitute a week’s work.
From time to time, ten (10) hour working shifts, exclusive of lunch, may be
made available. When ten (10) hour working shifts are available, the option,
within demand constraints, to work these shifts will be made available to
employees working eight (8) hour shifts. When an employee elects to change his
work shift to either an eight (8) hour or ten (10) hour work shift, he may not,
without management consent, again change his work shift from eight (8) to ten
(10) hours or from ten (10) hours to eight (8) hours.
Section
2. Each employee shall be entitled to two (2) or three (3) days off each week
which shall be consecutive, unless in conflict with shift or other assignments.
Section
3. An employee may elect to change hours of work and duty shifts, with the
consent of the employee’s Department Head, in which case Sections 1 and 2 would
not apply and hours worked and duty shifts would become forty (40) hours per
work week.
The employee may
request in writing to return to his previous hours and duty shifts at the
beginning of any following work week with seven (7) days notice upon approval
of Department Head.”
(Ex. 1, p. 32).
Regarding
management rights, Article 3 of the CBA provides:
“Section 2. The
Union acknowledges the concept of inherent management rights. These rights,
powers, and authority of the City include, but are not limited to the
following:
C. The right to
establish, allocate, schedule, assign, modify, change, and discontinue City
operations and work shifts, so long as changes in days off, shifts, and working
hours, other than in emergencies, which shall include but not be limited to,
unplanned absences, are made only after the order for such change has been
posted for seven (7) calendar days; except in instances which affect a single
work crew or a single employee, the City will make a good faith attempt to
deliver such notice.”
(Ex.
1, p. 5).
Article
19 of the CBA provides for the alteration of shifts in emergencies.
“Section
5. ALTERATION OF ORDINARY SHIFT Except for those employees that are on paid
on-call or standby status, an employee may be called into work on a shift that
is not his or her regular shift on a mandatory basis only when there is an
emergency. For the purposes of this clause, an “emergency” shall mean those
circumstances in which the City or any part thereof is suffering or is in
imminent danger of suffering from a natural disaster or other event, including
floods, tornadoes, or other occurrences which will seriously and substantially
endanger the health, safety, welfare or property of the citizens of the City of
Lincoln as determined by the Department Head or the Mayor.”
(Ex.
1, p. 35).
Article
18, Section 3 of the CBA provides for Employees to volunteer to participate in
standby status, from time to time. Id.
For those Employees that volunteer to be in a standby status, the Employees are
to be available to come in to conduct winter maintenance operations in case of
inclement weather that causes snowfall on the streets of the City of Lincoln
during hours outside their ordinary schedule. (18:6-19:18, 127:4-128:2)
For
at least the last twenty (20) years, the participation of Street Maintenance
Division Employees in such "standby" status and participation in
winter maintenance activities during periods of time outside the Employee's
regular schedule has been done on a purely voluntary basis. (18:6-19:18,
127:4-128:2)
The
Street Maintenance Manager sought to remedy a perceived problem of
understaffing for winter maintenance activities. On December 26, 2014, the
Street Maintenance Manager acknowledged the past practice of voluntary standby
and the necessity of an emergency declaration before Employees could be
compelled to work outside their regularly scheduled shifts. (192:6-200:18). Sometime
between January 2, 2015 and January 16, 2015, Employees represented by the
Petitioner became aware of the Respondent’s intent to adopt a new mandatory Plan
that could be implemented without the pre-condition of a declaration of an
emergency. Specifically, Respondent’s Plan would require Employees to be available
to work on a 7-days per week basis during winter months, subject to irregular
shifts, including working 12-hour shifts on a rotating 12-hours on/12-hours off
basis. During these periods of time, there would be no provision for two or
three consecutive days off as also provided for in the CBA. (Ex. 33,
49:11-52:20).
Upon
learning of this proposed Plan, the Petitioner’s Union President requested to
meet with the Respondent's representatives to discuss the intentions of the
Street Maintenance Division, and request to bargain. At a meeting on January
16, 2015, the Street Maintenance Manager advised the Petitioner of his
intentions to implement mandatory standby duty. (Exhibit 7, 35:5-16) The
Petitioner responded with a request to bargain before implementation of the
Plan by the Respondent.
On
or about January 22, 2015, the Public Works Director for the City of Lincoln
met with representatives of the Petitioner. The Petitioner advised the
Respondent that it believed that it had the right to bargain over any proposed changes
to Employee work schedules and the standby policy and made such a demand. The
Public Works Director advised the Petitioner that she wished to find a
negotiated solution to the matter, if possible, and requested that the
President of the Petitioner meet with the relevant Employees to hear their
concerns and return with any proposal or discussion topics that might be
relevant to the discussions between the parties. She also advised that that she
would halt any implementation of the policy issued by the Street Maintenance
Manager to facilitate such further discussions between the parties.
On
January 27, 2015 the Petitioner met with Employees and heard their concerns
about the proposed Plan. On January 28, 2015, the Petitioner met with the
Public Works Director to discuss the concerns of the Employees regarding the Plan.
On January 29, 2015, the Public Works Director, Street Maintenance Manager and Petitioner’s
Union President met with Employees at each Street Maintenance District shop. On
January 30, 2015, Respondent implemented its Plan, without having reached an
agreement with the Petitioner. (Ex. 20, Ex. 21, Ex. 23).
On
March 18, 2015, the parties agreed to reinitiate negotiations with regard to standby
scheduling for winter operations. The Respondent agreed at that time to cease
scheduling Employees to work any schedule outside the employee's regular shift
on a mandatory basis for a 30-day period. Instead, the parties agreed that the
Respondent would use or create standby lists to be filled on a voluntary basis,
so long as the Union committed to assist the Respondent to ensure full staffing
on a voluntary basis, and that the Respondent would be permitted to mandatorily
staff Employees in the event of an emergency, as already provided for in the
CBA.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner alleges that Respondent
committed a prohibited practice when it unilaterally implemented and refused to
bargain in good faith over a Plan that would permit Respondent to alter
Employees’ ordinary shift schedule, change the number of days worked in a
particular work week, and alter Employees’ entitlement to days off, without a
declaration of emergency or meeting the contractual notice requirement.
Respondent argues that the Commission lacks
jurisdiction to hear the case. Respondent also argues that the changes
implemented by its Plan are not mandatory subjects of bargaining; that they are
permitted by the
CBA; or are within the Respondent's management rights.
Jurisdiction
The
Commission finds that it has jurisdiction to determine whether the Respondent
has committed a prohibited practice. Respondent contends that the Commission
lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, as it amounts to a breach of contract
claim which requires the Commission to interpret and apply terms and conditions
of an existing CBA. The facts in this case constitute a viable prohibited
practice claim; which this Commission has been given jurisdiction to adjudicate
by virtue of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-824 and 48-825. See Nebraska Ass’n of Public Employees, Local 61 v. State of Nebraska Dep’t
of Correctional Services, 19 CIR 13 (2014), South Sioux City Educ. Ass’n v. South Sioux City Public Schools,
16 CIR 12 (2008), aff’d 278 Neb. 572 (2009); Ewing Educ. Ass’n v. Ewing Public Schools, 12 CIR 242 (1996).
Petitioner has successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Mandatory Subjects of
Bargaining
The
Nebraska Industrial Relations Act only requires parties to bargain over
mandatory subjects. There are three categories of bargaining subjects:
mandatory, permissive, and prohibited. Mandatory subjects are those subjects
that relate to “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
any question arising thereunder.” Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 48-816(1)(a). Additional mandatory subjects of bargaining
are those which “vitally affect” the terms and conditions of employment. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 8 v.
Douglas County, 16 CIR 401 (2010). In particular, the Commission has held
that work schedule changes that are primarily related to an employee's hours of
work are those which "vitally affect" the terms and conditions of
employment, and must be bargained for. Nebraska
Association of Public Employees, Local 61 v. State of Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, 19 CIR
13 (2014). Failure to bargain for any changes to these items is a per se
violation of the Act and a prohibited practice.
In order to establish working
guidelines as to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Metro Technical
Community College Education Ass’n set forth the following test:
“A matter which is
of fundamental, basic, or essential concern to an employee’s financial and
personal concern may be considered as involving working conditions and is
mandatorily bargainable even though there may be some minor influence on
educational policy or management prerogative. However, those matters which
involve foundational value judgments, which strike at the very heart of the
educational philosophy of the particular institution, are management
prerogatives and are not a proper subject for negotiations even though such
decisions may have some impact on working conditions. However, the impact of
whatever decision management may make in this or any other case on the economic
welfare of employees is a proper subject of mandatory bargaining.”
Metropolitan Tech. Community College Educ. Ass’n v.
Metropolitan Tech. Community College Area, 203 Neb. 832, 842 (Neb. 1979).
Mandatory
subjects of bargaining are not just topics for discussion during negotiations.
Unless clearly waived, mandatory subjects must be bargained for before, during,
and after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City of
Omaha, 15 CIR 292 (2007).
In considering the definition of the various subjects of bargaining, decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) are instructive but not controlling. Crete Educ. Ass'n v. Saline Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 76-0002, 265 Neb. 8, 21 (2002).
The NLRB has long held that hours are a mandatory
subject of bargaining. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., Wooster Div., 356 U.S.
342, 349 (1958). The term “hours” has been held to mean work schedules and whether there should be Sunday
work. See Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). The NLRB has
specifically held work schedules to be mandatory subjects of bargaining. T-West
Sales & Service, 346 N.L.R.B. 132 (2005); Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of Fayetteville, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 900 (2000) (employer
unilaterally changed starting time for an employee in violation of
NLRA…unilateral schedule changes unlawful where it affected how employees could
arrange their workday); Our Lady of Lourdes Health Center, 306 N.L.R.B.
337, 339 (1992).
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
763 v. Omaha Public Power District, 19 CIR 119 (2015).
A
topic can be established as a subject of bargaining if it has been a past
practice between the parties. “An employer has a duty to not change past
practices for employees who are represented by a union until it has bargained
to impasse on that subject with the union.” NLRB
v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745-747 (1962). To establish past practice, the
practice must have occurred “with such regularity and frequency that employees
could reasonably expect the ‘practice’ to continue or reoccur on a regular and
consistent basis.” Sunoco, Inc., 349
N.L.R.B. 240, 244 (2007); Philadelphia
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 340 N.L.R.B. 349, 353 (2003), enfd. Mem. 112
Fed.Appx. 65 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
"[A]n
employer's practices, even if not required by a collective bargaining
agreement, which are regular and longstanding, rather than random and
intermittent, become terms and conditions of unit employee' s employment, which
cannot be altered without offering their collective-bargaining representative
notice and an opportunity to bargain over the proposed change." Service Employees International Union Local
226 v. Douglas County School District 001, 17 C1R 428 (2012), aff’d 286
Neb. 768 (2013) (citing Sunoco. Inc.,
349 N.L.R.B. 240, 244 (2007)).
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
763 v. Omaha Public Power District, 19 CIR 119 (2015).
Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 48-816(1)(a) defines good faith bargaining as the
“performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the labor
organization to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment…”. The Act does
not require parties to agree to any proposals put forth in negotiations, only
that the parties “confer in good faith” about those subjects which are subjects
of bargaining. Section 48-824(1) states that it is a prohibited practice for
any public employer to refuse to negotiate in good faith with respect to a
mandatory subject of bargaining. In NLRB
v. Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court held that unilateral changes to mandatory
subjects of bargaining before impasse are per se violations of the party’s duty
to bargain in good faith. 369 U.S. 736, 737 (1962).
“The Commission
determined that an employer may lawfully implement changes in terms and
conditions of employment which are mandatory topics of bargaining only when
three conditions have been met: (1) the parties have bargained to impasse, (2)
the terms and conditions implemented were contained in a final offer, and (3)
the implementation occurred before a petition regarding the year in dispute is
filed with the Commission.(internal citations omitted) If any of these three
conditions are not met, then the employer’s unilateral implementation of
changes in mandatory bargaining topics is a per se violation of the duty to
bargain in good faith.”
Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. County of
Hall, Nebraska, 15
CIR 95 (2005). See also Service Employees
International Union (AFL-CIO) Local 226 v. Douglas County School District 001, 286
Neb. 755 (2013).
In
Nebraska Association of Public Employees,
Local 61 the Commission found that:
“[T]he Pilot
Program proposed by Respondent is the type of work schedule change which would
be primarily related to an employee's hours and would "vitally
affect" the terms and conditions of employment. As such, a new scheduling
program such as the Pilot Program proposed by Respondent is a mandatory subject
of bargaining. Respondent's failure to bargain with Petitioner regarding the
Pilot Program is a per se violation of the IRA and a prohibited practice.”
Nebraska
Association of Public Employees, Local 61 v. State of Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, 19 CIR
13 (2014).
The
Program at issue in that case was voluntary. However, the voluntary nature of
that Program did not change the fact that employee work hours are a matter for
negotiations. It is clear that a change to employee work hours, such as that
implemented by the Respondent herein, would also be a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
The
Commission finds that the Plan unilaterally implemented by the Respondent would
“vitally affect” the hours and terms and conditions of employment. Further, the
Commission finds that the past practice of voluntary standby has been in place
for at least 20 years and occurred with such regularity and frequency that Employees
could reasonably expect the practice to continue or reoccur on a regular and
consistent basis. As such, the Commissions finds that the Plan implemented by
the Respondent is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Respondent
had a duty to bargain in good faith with Petitioner regarding implementation of
the Plan. Respondent did not meet the conditions discussed above as set forth
in Communication Workers of America, 15
CIR 95 (2005), before implementation of the Plan. Therefore, the Commission
finds that Respondent’s unilateral implementation of the Plan is a per se
violation of the Act and a prohibited practice.
With
respect to the meetings between the parties about the Plan, the Public Works
Director and the Street Maintenance Manager intended to implement the Plan
without any further bargaining. (Ex. 7, Ex. 20, Ex. 21, Ex. 23, 35:5-16). However,
as a per se prohibited practice has been found, further analysis of good faith
bargaining is unnecessary to the resolution of this case. See Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO
v. County of Hall, Nebraska, 15 CIR 95 (2005); Service Employees International Union (AFL-CIO) Local 226 v. Douglas
County School District 001, 286 Neb. 755 (2013).
Management Prerogative
and Staffing
Some
subjects are considered management prerogatives and may generally be altered at
the will of the employer. See Metropolitan Tech. Community College Educ.
Ass'n v. Metropolitan Tech. Community College Area, 203 Neb. 832
(1979). The Commission has used a relationship test in determining bargaining
issues. "Whether an issue is one for bargaining under the Court of
Industrial Relations Act depends upon whether it is primarily related to wages,
hours and conditions of employment of the employees, or whether it is primarily
related to formulation or management of public policy." See Coleridge
Educ. Ass 'n v. Cedar County School Dist. No. 1-1-0541. a/k/a
Coleridge Community Schools, 13 CIR 376 (2001).
In
the present case, Respondent argues the changes implemented by its Plan are staffing
issues within its management rights. It is true that the Commission has found
“staffing” to be management prerogative in several cases.
“Issues related to
daily staffing and overall staffing requirements are management prerogatives.
See Professional Firefighters Ass’n of
Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, 16 CIR 408 (2011). Issues of staffing
related to “scheduling work such as daily staffing, staffing by rank, and
overall staffing requirements are management prerogatives. See also School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass’n v. School
Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 784, 199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (1972). In Professional Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha,
Local 385, the Commission stated that these recognized staffing issues are
management prerogatives because those staffing issues are more closely related
to the assignment of work.
Employees United Labor Association v.
Douglas County, 17
CIR 195 (2011) (Assignment of work to non-bargaining unit employees is a daily
staffing issue).
The
types of changes to Employees’ hours, work schedules and days off as
implemented by Respondent’s Plan are not management prerogative “staffing”
issues as contemplated by the Commission in the cases cited above. Instead, the
Plan is a “type of work schedule change which would be primarily related to an
employee's hours and would "vitally affect" the terms and conditions
of employment.” Nebraska Association of
Public Employees, Local 61 v. State of Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, 19 CIR 13 (2014). This is a mandatory
subject of bargaining as discussed above.
Additionally,
Respondent claims that it can force the Plan under the current CBA. This
position appears to have first been asserted after the unilateral
implementation of the Plan, in defense of this petition. (192:6-200:18). The
CBA defines hours of work and duty shifts, notice requirements and emergency
changes that appear to vary from the Respondent’s Plan. However, the Commission
declines to interpret and apply terms and conditions of an existing CBA.
Remedial
Authority
In its Petition, Petitioner prays that the
Commission declare Respondent's unilateral changes to work schedules and hours
of work of the Employees to be a prohibited practice under the Act. Further,
Petitioner requests that the Commission order
Respondent to cease and desist implementing any change to the schedule of work
that creates new 12-hour shifts, continuous
24-hour scheduled rotating shifts or that would not provide for at least
two consecutive days off in a work week.
Petitioner requests that the Commission
order Respondents to cease and desist from creating a mandatory standby policy
for the Employees or creating a
mandatory rotating shifts. Petitioner also seeks costs incurred in bringing this
action including, but not limited to, attorney's fees.
The
Commission has the authority to issue cease and desist orders following
findings of prohibited practices and has done so in the past. See Local Union 571 International Union of
Operating Engineers v. County of Douglas, 15 CIR 75 (2005); Ewing Education Ass’n v. Holt County School
District No. 29, 12 CIR 242 (1996) (en banc). In the present case, the
Commission finds that the Respondent has committed a prohibited practice under
the Nebraska Industrial Relations Act. Therefore, an order requiring that the Respondent
cease and desist from committing the prohibited practice is clearly within the
authority of the Commission and will be ordered.
The
Commission has authority to award attorney’s fees, but has found it to be an
appropriate remedy in cases where an employer’s misconduct was flagrant,
aggravated, persistent, and pervasive. See
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 8 v. Douglas County, et. al., 16 CIR
401 (2010). Respondent’s actions in this case do not rise to the level deemed
appropriate for the award of attorney fees. The Commission finds that the parties are to pay their own
costs and fees.
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent shall:
1. Cease
and desist from failing to bargain in good faith with the Public Association of
Government Employees regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining.
2. Cease
and desist from unilaterally implementing its Mandatory Standby Plan or any
other change to the work schedules and hours of work of the Employees without
first bargaining to impasse.
All
Panel Commissioners join in the entry of this Order.