19
CIR 132 (2015)
NEBRASKA COMMISSION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE #26, Petitioner v. LINCOLN
COUNTY, NEBRASKA, Respondent,
SHERIFF
OF LINCOLN COUNTY, NEBRASKA,
Respondent, LINCOLN
COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
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Case
No. 1388 FINDINGS
AND ORDER |
Filed November 2,
2015
APPEARANCES:
For Petitioner: Gary L.
Young
Keating,
O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, PC, LLO
530
South 13th Street, Ste 100
Lincoln,
NE 68508
For
Respondents: Jerry
L. Pigsley
Woods
& Aitken LLP
301
South 13th Street
Lincoln,
NE 68508
Before
Commissioners Carlson, Spray, and Partsch
CARLSON,
Commissioner
NATURE OF THE CASE
On January 23, 2015, the Fraternal
Order of Police, Lodge #26 (“Union” or “Petitioner”) filed this action with the
Commission, alleging that Lincoln County (“County”), the Lincoln County Sheriff
(“Sheriff”), and the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners (the “Board,”
together with the County and Sheriff, “Respondents”) committed a prohibited
practice under the Nebraska Industrial Relations Act (“Act”) when Respondents
unilaterally changed and refused to bargain with Petitioner regarding the
monthly rate of pay of employees, the terms of payment, and the use of vacation
and compensatory time.
A trial was held April 21, 2015
before the Honorable Joel E. Carlson.
FACTS
For at least 28 years, the County has
paid employees’ monthly wages, benefits and overtime compensation on the last
business day of each month, which might include payment for hours not yet
worked. In 2014, the Nebraska Legislature passed LB 560 to amend Neb. Rev. Stat. §§48-1228, 48-1230 and
48-1231 of the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act, “to provide powers and
duties for the Commissioner of Labor; to provide for enforcement of the
Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act; to
change requirements for employers to provide wage statements as prescribed;
to harmonize provisions; and to repeal the original sections.” (Emphasis added).
2013 Bill Text NE LB 560.
LB 560 specifically amended Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-1230 to require employers
to provide a detailed wage statement, which is to include the actual hours
worked.
“On each regular
payday, the employer shall deliver or make available to each employee, by mail
or electronically, or shall provide at the employee's normal place of
employment during employment hours for all shifts a wage statement showing, at
a minimum, the identity of the employer, the hours for which the employee was
paid, the wages earned by the employee, and deductions made for the employee.”
Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1230(2).
In June 2014, the County began to
analyze what would need to be done in order to comply with the changes mandated
by LB 560. The County determined that it would transition the payroll system in
order to comply with the amended law by establishing a two-week pay lag between
the end of the pay period and the pay day.
On October 13, 2014, the Board
passed a resolution adopting a new Payroll Conversion Plan (the “Plan”) which
would set the pay period from the 16th day of the month to the 15th
day of the following month, with the pay day set as the last working day of the
month after the end of the pay period. In order to transition to the new Plan,
the County would shift the pay period by a certain number of days with the pay
day commencing on the last business day of the month. For example, the first
pay period of 2015 began on January 1, 2015 and ended January 29, 2015 with the
pay day as the last working day of the month. The next pay period would then
begin January 30, 2015 and would end February 25, 2015. The pay day for this
pay period would be the last working day of February 2015. The Plan would
continue to adjust the start and end of the pay period throughout the year
until the final month in November, 2015, where the pay period would begin on
November 16, 2015 and end December 15, 2015. The pay day for this final pay
period of transition would be the last working day of December 2015. As a
consequence, eight hours of pay would be deducted from an employee each month
of the transition, equaling 88 hours by November 2015. The Board would allow
employees the option to cash out accrued vacation days, personal days or
compensatory time, “limited to the number of days needed so the deferment would
not affect the employees [sic] normal monthly paycheck.” (Exhibit 24).
In December 2014, employees of the
Lincoln County Sheriff’s office were given written notice of the Plan, and employees
signed a form confirming receipt of the written notice. On December 15, 2014,
the Union’s national labor specialist sent a letter to the Lincoln County
Attorney to demand that the County cease and desist from implementing the new Plan
and to request bargaining. After a meeting on January 5, 2015, the Board sent a
letter to the Union dated January 6, 2015 to request negotiations on the
limited question of complying with the changes of LB 560 on January 12, 2015.
The parties were unable to meet until January 22, 2015. During the meeting,
Petitioner presented proposals regarding the Plan. However, Respondents
indicated that the Plan would be implemented as of January 1, 2015 for the
upcoming pay day scheduled for January 30, 2015. A Board Commissioner at the
meeting indicated that he would take the Union’s proposals to the Board meeting
scheduled for January 26, 2015. Additionally, the County Clerk indicated that
she could make changes to the Plan before the January 30, 2015 pay day if the
Board voted to approve changes to the Plan during its January 26, 2015 meeting.
Petitioner filed this action on
January 23, 2015. During the Board meeting of January 26, 2015, the Board chose
not to make any changes to the Plan. The January 30, 2015 payroll was paid
pursuant to the Plan. The Petitioner then filed a motion for status quo. The
Commission entered a status quo order which required the County to rescind the
pay lag during the pendency of this litigation.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner alleges that Respondents committed
a prohibited practice when it refused to negotiate with Petitioner regarding
changes to the monthly payroll schedule and unlawfully unilaterally implemented
the Plan before the parties negotiated to impasse. Petitioner also alleges that
Respondents violated the Act by directly dealing with bargaining unit employees
regarding the use of vacation and compensatory time banks to supplement their
paychecks under the Plan.
Respondents argue that the
Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. If jurisdiction is found,
Respondents argue that they had the management right to establish and modify
statutory financial policies and accounting procedures and that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) does not require that the County pay employees on
a monthly basis. Additionally, Respondents contend that there was no refusal to
bargain on the part of Respondents because Respondents proposed to negotiate
with Petitioner about economic impacts of their management right decision to
create and implement the Plan.
Jurisdiction
The Commission finds that it has
jurisdiction to determine whether the Respondent has committed a prohibited
practice. Respondents contend that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear
this case, as it amounts to a breach of contract claim which requires the
Commission to interpret and apply terms and conditions of an existing CBA. The
facts in this case may very well establish a breach of contract claim of which
the Commission has no jurisdiction to determine. The facts in this case also
constitute a viable prohibited practice claim; which this Commission has been
given jurisdiction to adjudicate by virtue of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-824 and
48-825. See Nebraska Ass’n of Public
Employees, Local 61 v. State of Nebraska Dep’t of Correctional Services, 19
CIR 13 (2014), South Sioux City Educ.
Ass’n v. South Sioux City Public Schools, 16 CIR 12 (2008), aff’d 278 Neb.
572 (2009); Ewing Educ. Ass’n v. Ewing
Public Schools, 12 CIR 242 (1996). Petitioner has successfully invoked the
jurisdiction of the Commission.
Prohibited Practice
Allegations: Refusal to Bargain in Good Faith
The
Commission finds that the Plan unilaterally implemented by Respondents would
“vitally affect” the terms and conditions of employment. As such, the Plan
implemented by Respondents is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Respondents
had a duty to bargain in good faith with Petitioner regarding implementation
and economic impact of the Plan. Therefore, Respondents’ failure to bargain
with Petitioner regarding the Plan is a per se violation of the Industrial
Relations Act and a prohibited practice.
Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 48-816(1)(a) defines good faith bargaining as the
“performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the labor
organization to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment…”. The Act does
not require parties to agree to any proposals put forth in negotiations, only
that the parties “confer in good faith” about those subjects which are mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Section 48-824(1) states that it is a prohibited
practice for any public employer to refuse to negotiate in good faith with
respect to a mandatory subject of bargaining. In NLRB v. Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court held that unilateral changes
to mandatory subjects of bargaining before impasse are per se violations of the
party’s duty to bargain in good faith. 369 U.S. 736, 737 (1962).
“The Commission
determined that an employer may lawfully implement changes in terms and
conditions of employment which are mandatory topics of bargaining only when
three conditions have been met: (1) the parties have bargained to impasse, (2)
the terms and conditions implemented were contained in a final offer, and (3)
the implementation occurred before a petition regarding the year in dispute is
filed with the Commission.(internal citations omitted) If any of these three
conditions are not met, then the employer’s unilateral implementation of
changes in mandatory bargaining topics is a per se violation of the duty to
bargain in good faith.”
Communication
Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. County of Hall, Nebraska, 15 CIR 95 (2005).
See also Service Employees International
Union (AFL-CIO) Local 226 v. Douglas County School District 001, 286 Neb.
755 (2013).
There are three categories of
bargaining subjects: mandatory, permissive, and prohibited. Mandatory subjects
are those subjects that relate to “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or any question arising thereunder.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-816(1)(a). Additional mandatory subjects
of bargaining are those which “vitally affect” the terms and conditions of
employment. Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge No. 8 v. Douglas County, 16 CIR 401 (2010). The Nebraska Industrial
Relations Act only requires parties to bargain over mandatory subjects.
In order to establish working
guidelines as to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Metro Technical
Community College Education Ass’n set forth the following test:
“A matter which is
of fundamental, basic, or essential concern to an employee’s financial and
personal concern may be considered as involving working conditions and is
mandatorily bargainable even though there may be some minor influence on
educational policy or management prerogative. However, those matters which
involve foundational value judgments, which strike at the very heart of the
educational philosophy of the particular institution, are management
prerogatives and are not a proper subject for negotiations even though such
decisions may have some impact on working conditions. However, the impact of
whatever decision management may make in this or any other case on the economic
welfare of employees is a proper subject of mandatory bargaining.”
Metropolitan Tech. Community College
Educ. Ass’n v. Metropolitan Tech. Community College Area,
203 Neb. 832, 842 (Neb. 1979).
Mandatory
subjects of bargaining are not just topics for discussion during negotiations.
Unless clearly waived, mandatory subjects must be bargained for before, during,
and after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City of
Omaha, 15 CIR 292 (2007). Once a topic has been found to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the burden of proving a waiver falls on the party
asserting the waiver.
In considering the definition of the
various subjects of bargaining, decisions of the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) are instructive but not controlling. The National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) has held that changes in payroll periods are a mandatory subject
of bargaining. Visiting Nurse Services of
Western Massachusetts, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 1125 (1998), enforced 177 F.3d 52
(1st Cir. 1999). In Visiting Nurse
Services, the employer unilaterally implemented a new payroll system to
change employees from a weekly payroll schedule to a biweekly payroll schedule
without bargaining to impasse with the Union.
Further,
a topic can be established as a subject of bargaining if it has been a past
practice between the parties. “An employer has a duty to not change past
practices for employees who are represented by a union until it has bargained
to impasse on that subject with the union.” NLRB
v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745-747 (1962). To establish past practice, the
practice must have occurred “with such regularity and frequency that employees
could reasonably expect the ‘practice’ to continue or reoccur on a regular and
consistent basis.” Sunoco, Inc., 349
N.L.R.B. 240, 244 (2007); Philadelphia
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 340 N.L.R.B. 349, 353 (2003), enfd. Mem. 112
Fed.Appx. 65 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Management
Prerogative and Economic Impact
The
Commission finds that the Respondents’ management rights do not remove
Respondents’ duty to bargain regarding the Plan. In the present case, Respondents
argue that Article II, Section 2(J) of the CBA, which states that the County has
the management right to establish, implement, modify, and change statutory
financial policies, accounting procedures for County personnel, gives them
management prerogative to create and implement the Plan. As the Commission has
previously stated:
“The Commission
will not be persuaded by vague, all inclusive statements in bargaining
agreements that employers may do whatever they please, which if taken to their
logical conclusion under the Respondents’ arguments, would negate the entire
agreement and the bargaining process established by the Industrial Relations
Act. Broad statements to the effect that the public employer maintains the
right to manage all operations of that entity and maintains the right to change
or discontinue any regulations or procedures do not override the requirement of
bargaining in good faith regarding subjects of mandatory bargaining.”
Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City
of Omaha, 15 CIR 292, 300 (2007).
Although the change in the monthly payroll
practice may have some element of management prerogative, the payroll practice
had been in place for at least 28 years. By all accounts, employees had become
dependent on when and how their pay would be distributed and how vacation and
compensatory time could be accrued and used. Respondents’ Plan did not change
the date that employees would be paid, but would adjust the pay period for
employees over the course of 11 months. The forced decision to either take an
eight hour per month reduction in pay or use vacation or compensatory time to
make up the loss is essential to an employee’s financial and personal position.
The economic impact that the change in the monthly payroll practice would cause
is also a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The
January 22, 2015 meeting between the parties was at best an illusory attempt on
the part of the Respondents to bargain the economic impact of the Plan.
Respondents intended to implement its Plan without any further bargaining or
considering any alternatives to comply with LB 560. As a per se prohibited
practice has been found, further analysis of good faith bargaining is
unnecessary to the resolution of this case.
Waiver
The Commission finds that the
Petitioner did not waive its right to bargain. Respondents argue that
Petitioner waived its right to object to the Plan based upon Respondent’s
management rights under the CBA. The Commission has found that the duty to
bargain can be waived. The burden of proving waiver was on the party asserting
the waiver. Washington County Police
Officers Ass’n/F.O.P. Lodge 36 v. County of Washington, 17 CIR 114 (2011).
In Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 21 v.
City of Ralston, 12 CIR 59 (1987), the Commission stated that the standard
of proving waiver of a statutorily protected right must be clear and
unmistakable. Additionally, once a union has notice of a proposed change in a
mandatory subject of bargaining, it must make a timely request to bargain. “A
union cannot charge an employer with refusal to negotiate when it has made no
attempts to bring the employer to the bargaining table.” Id. (citing NLRB v. Alva
Allen Indus., Inc., 369 F.2d 310, 321 (8th Cir. 1966)). “It is
well settled Board law that ‘when an employer notifies a union of proposed
changes in terms and conditions of employment, it is incumbent upon the union
to act with due diligence in requesting bargaining.’” Id. (citing Haddon Craftsmen,
Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 789, 790 (1990)). Notice from the employer does not have
to be formal, and it is not unlawful for the proposed change to be presented as
a fully developed plan. Id.
Respondents began working on changes
to the monthly payroll practice as early as June 2014 in anticipation of the
change in the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act. The Board approved the
new Plan during its meeting on October 13, 2014. The County gave employees
written notices of the new Plan in December 2014, and employees signed forms to
show that they had received the notices. On December 15, 2014, the Union’s
national labor specialist sent a letter to the Lincoln County Attorney to
demand that the County cease and desist from implementing the new Plan and to
request bargaining (Exhibit 3). This letter put the County on notice that the
Union opposed the implementation of the Plan. The Petitioner’s actions to force
bargaining in the matter were timely under the circumstances and do not
constitute a waiver of its rights to bargain.
With respect to the management
rights as outlined in the CBA, the provision allowing the County to “modify and
change statutory financial policies” is overly broad and does not constitute a waiver
on such important mandatory subjects of bargaining. Respondents failed to prove
a waiver by the Petitioner.
Direct Dealing
The Commission finds that direct
dealing occurred when the County contacted the members of the bargaining unit
directly regarding the use of individual vacation and compensatory time to
supplement their reduced paychecks under the Plan. The County communicated
directly to members of the Union through email and direct notices (Exhibits 16
and 17). The County’s act of bypassing union representation by directly dealing
with bargaining unit employees regarding mandatory topics of bargaining is a
prohibited practice pursuant to subsections (a), (e) & (f) of Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 48-824(2).
The
United States Supreme Court has held that bypassing a certified or recognized
collective bargaining agent and dealing directly with a represented employee
concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining, such as wages and other terms and
conditions of employment, violates NLRA § 8(a)(1) and (5). J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). The NLRB uses
the following criteria in determining whether direct dealing has occurred: (1)
the employer communicated directly with its union-represented employees; (2)
the communication was for the purpose of establishing or changing the wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment or undercutting the union’s role
in bargaining; and (3) such communication was to the exclusion of the union. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 316 N.L.R.B. 979
(1995).
Wage Law Compliance
Respondents
also argue that its Plan seeks to bring the contract into compliance with LB
560 and that the Respondents had no choice but to alter their payroll to comply
with the new State law. Compliance with a new law does not remove the duty to
bargain over mandatory subjects of bargaining. IBEW v. OPPD, 16 CIR 394 (2009), aff’d 280 Neb. 889 (2010). Further, there was evidence that there were
alternatives to bring Lincoln County into compliance with LB 560 that did not
require Respondents to choose this specific plan that was unilaterally
implemented.
Remedial
Authority
In its Petition, Petitioner prays
that the Commission order Respondents to cease and desist implementation of any
change to the number of days or hours in a monthly payroll check and any
attempts to direct deal with the employees represented by the bargaining unit.
Petitioner also requests that the Commission order Respondents to pay costs,
including attorney fees to Petitioner.
The
Commission has the authority to issue cease and desist orders following
findings of prohibited practices and has done so in the past. See Local Union 571 International Union of
Operating Engineers v. County of Douglas, 15 CIR 75 (2005); Ewing Education Ass’n v. Holt County School
District No. 29, 12 CIR 242 (1996) (en banc). In the present case, the
Commission finds that an order requiring that the offending party cease and
desist from committing the prohibited practice found by the Commission is
clearly within its authority and will therefore be ordered.
The Commission has authority to award attorney’s fees, but has found it to be an appropriate remedy in cases where an employer’s misconduct was flagrant, aggravated, persistent, and pervasive. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 8 v. Douglas County, et. al., 16 CIR 401 (2010). Respondents’ actions in this case do not rise to the level deemed appropriate for the award of attorney fees. The Commission finds that the parties are to pay their own costs and fees.
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondents shall:
1. Cease
and desist from failing to bargain in good faith with the Fraternal Order of
Police, Lodge #26 regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining.
2. Cease
and desist from unilaterally implementing its Payroll Conversion Plan or any
other change to the number of days or hours in a monthly payroll check without
first bargaining to impasse.
3. Cease
and desist from direct dealing with employees represented by the Fraternal
Order of Police, Lodge #26.
All
Panel Commissioners join in the entry of this Order.