16 CIR 506 (2010)
NEBRASKA COMMISSION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Entered December 6, 2010
Before: Commissioners Lindahl, Burger and McGinn
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS:
South Sioux City Education Association, (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§48-811, 48-816(1), and 48-819.01 (Reissue 2004), claiming that the Dakota County School District No. 22-0011, a/k/a South Sioux City Community Schools (“Respondent”), is refusing to vertically advance continuing teachers on the salary schedule based upon a contract continuation clause in the parties’ current collective bargaining agreement.
The Commission held a preliminary proceeding on October 21, 2010 and then held an evidentiary hearing on the issues on November 5, 2010. The parties jointly served the Commission simultaneous post-trial briefs on November 18, 2010, detailing the issues presented at the hearing.
At the hearing, the Petitioner requested an immediate temporary order directing the Respondent to vertically advance teachers on the salary schedule, with back pay and any other relief deemed appropriate. The Respondent denied that such relief is appropriate under the collective bargaining agreement, suggesting the Commission lacks jurisdiction to determine the issues, and requests the parties return to bargaining.
The Respondent argues that the Commission lacks jurisdiction because the Commission does not have the authority to interpret the contract continuation clause of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The Respondent’s argument essentially states the Commission is not authorized to settle breach of contract disputes. In support of its argument, the Respondent cites Transport Workers of America v. Transport Authority of Omaha, 205 Neb. 26, 286 N.W.2d 102 (1979). The Petitioner argues that the Nebraska Supreme Court decision in Central City Educ. Ass’n v. Merrick County Sch. Dist. No. 61-0004, 280 Neb. 27, 783 N.W.2d 600 (2010), endorses the use of contract continuation language, thus requiring the Commission to order the Respondent to follow the contract continuation language in this case. The Petitioner argues that if contract continuation clauses are not subject to interpretation then the Supreme Court’s decision in Central City is meaningless.
In providing a forum for the public employer and public employees to resolve disputes regarding terms and conditions of employment, the Act was not intended to create a special judicial system for resolving breach of contract cases by public employees. See Transport Workers of America v. Transit Authority of the City of Omaha, 205 Neb. 26, 286 N.W.2d 102 (1979) where our Supreme Court said:
If the CIR has authority to hear cases involving an alleged breach of contract, declared rights, duties, and obligations of parties and grant equitable relief such as an accounting, that authority must be found in the Constitution and statutes creating and authorizing the CIR. We are unable to find such authority.
205 Neb. at 31. Transport Workers sets forth the Supreme Court’s holding that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to interpret and apply terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement - an action for a breach of contract must be brought in a court of general jurisdiction. The Commission of Industrial Relations was created by the Legislature under the general grant of legislative power under Article III, Section 1. Orleans Education Assn. v. School District of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 229 N.W.2d 172 (1975). The jurisdiction of the Commission flows from Article XV, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska and from the provisions of Sections 48-801 to 48-838 R.R.S. 1943. See University Police Officers Union v. University of Nebraska, 203 Neb. 4, 277, N.W.2d 529 (1979). The authority of the Commission is carefully circumscribed. University Police Officers Union v. University of Nebraska, Supra, Transport Workers of America v. Transit Auth. of City of Omaha , 205 Neb. 26 286 N.W.2d 102 (1979).
In the instant case, the Commission is persuaded by the position of the Respondent. The crux of the Petitioner’s claim is breach of contract. The Transport Workers decision held:
It appears to us that the Act has not in any manner attempted to grant the CIR powers [in the sense of subject matter jurisdiction] to resolve breach of contract cases even if the breach concerns itself with terms, tenure, or conditions of employment. Once an agreement is reached and a subsequent breach is alleged to have occurred, the parties are required to litigate their dispute in a competent court having jurisdiction of the matter.
205 Neb. at 33-34. In providing a forum for the public employer and public employees to resolve disputes regarding terms and conditions of employment, the Act was not intended to create a special judicial system for resolving breach of contract cases by public employees. We can find no language in Central City Educ. Ass’n v. Merrick County Sch. Dist. No. 61-0004, 280 Neb. 27, 783 N.W.2d 600 (2010), which overrules Transport Workers. Also, unlike other cases previously before the Commission (where we have been asked if the Respondent’s acts constituted a prohibited practice), the instant case was not filed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-824. Clearly, in this case we have been asked to interpret the contract and have been presented with unique contractual issues, namely the issue of parole evidence. This issue is a breach of contract issue and the Commission lacks the appropriate jurisdiction to hear this case. Therefore this case is not properly before the Commission.
THE COMMISSION HEREBY FINDS that the Petition does not seek proper relief and the issues are not within the Commission's jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition is dismissed without prejudice.
All panel commissioners join in the entry of this order.