16 CIR 408 (2011)

NEBRASKA COMMISSION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Entered January 4, 2011

APPEARANCES:

Before:  Commissioners McGinn,  Orr,  Blake, Burger and Lindahl (En Banc).  Burger dissenting.

MCGINN, C.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS:

This action was brought by the Professional Firefighters of Omaha, Local 385 (“Petitioner” or “Union”) pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-818 a labor organization as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-801(6) (Reissue 2004). The Petitioner is the duly recognized collective bargaining representative of a bargaining unit consisting of employee classifications of firefighter, fire apparatus engineer, fire captain, drill master, EMS shift supervisors, assistant fire marshal, and battalion chief of the City of Omaha (“Respondent” or “City”). The Petitioner seeks the resolution of an industrial dispute over wages and other terms and conditions of employment for the December 30, 2008 to December 28, 2009 contract year.

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-818 the Commission is charged with determining rates of pay and conditions of employment which are comparable to prevalent wage rates paid and conditions of employment maintained under the same or similar working conditions. In accomplishing this, the Commission hears evidence from each of the parties concerning the similarity and appropriateness of including the members of the array proposed by each of them. The Commission then chooses the array cities which are sufficiently the same or similar. This is a determination of fact and made from the evidence on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the Commission is not required to consider every possible array, but seeks one which is sufficiently representative so as to determine whether the wages paid or benefits given are comparable. See Lincoln Co. Sheriff’s Emp. Ass’n v. County of Lincoln, 216 Neb. 274, 343 N.W. 2d 735 (1984). Once the array is chosen, the Commission then establishes prevalent wage rates paid and conditions of employment, determining the overall compensation.

ARRAY:

The parties have five array cities, which they agree are similar, and should be included in the array. These cities are: Lincoln, NE; Milwaukee, WI; Madison, WI; Des Moines, IA; and St. Paul, MN. The Petitioner proposes including the additional cities of Cincinnati, OH and Columbus, OH. The Respondent proposes instead to include the city of St. Louis, MO in the array.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-818 gives the Commission discretion in its determination of what is comparable to the prevailing wage rate. See Lincoln Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Lincoln, 198 Neb. 174, 252 N.W.2d 607 (1977). While the Industrial Relations Act does not define comparable, nor specifically directs the Commission in the manner and process of its determination, the Commission has received some guidance from the Nebraska Supreme Court. In Omaha Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Omaha, 194 Neb. 436, 440-41, 231 N.W.2d 710, 713-14 (1975), the Supreme Court found that

“a prevalent [sic] wage rate to be determined by the Court of Industrial Relations must almost invariably be determined after consideration of a combination of factors…. Under Section 48-818, R.R.S. 1943, in selecting cities in reasonably similar labor markets for the purpose of comparison in arriving at comparable and prevalent wage rates the question is whether, as a matter of fact, the cities selected for comparison are sufficiently similar and have enough like characteristics or qualities to make comparison appropriate.”

As a general rule, the factors most often used to determine comparability are geographic proximity, population, job descriptions, job skills and job conditions. Douglas Cty. Health Dept. Emp. Ass’n v. Douglas Cty., 229 Neb. 301, 427 N.W.2d 28 (1988); AFSCME Local 2088 v. County of Douglas, 208 Neb. 511, 304 N.W.2d 368 (1981), modified in 209 Neb. 397, 309 N.W.2d 65 (1981). Balance is another factor that has been considered regarding selection of array cities. “Balancing an array” is defined as using some cities that are larger and some that are smaller in population than the subject city. However, as previously held, the Commission will also not assume that balance automatically impacts array members and absent credible evidence, the Commission will not use it as criteria in its selection process. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 24, City of Grand Island, 14 CIR 59 (2002).

The cities agreed upon by both parties will be included in the array. In numerous past cases, the Commission has expressed its preference for arrays containing more than four (4) or five (5) members whenever possible. Grand Island Educ. Ass’n v. Hall County School Dist. No. 0002, 11 CIR 237 (1992); International Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 1575 v. City of Columbus, 11 CIR 267 (1992); Douglas County Health Dept. Employees Ass’n v. County of Douglas, 9 CIR 219 (1987). The Commission has held that arrays consisting of six (6) to eight (8) members are appropriate. O’Neill Educ. Ass’n v. Holt County School Dist. No. 7, 11 CIR 11 (1990); Red Cloud Educ. Ass’n v. School Dist. of Red Cloud, 10 CIR 120 (1989); Logan County Educ. Ass’n v. School Dist. of Stapleton, 10 CIR 1 (1988); Trenton Educ. Ass’n v. School Dist. of Trenton, 9 CIR 201 (1987). However, there have been cases where four or five member arrays have been found to be adequate. Hastings Educ. Ass’n v. the School Dist. of Hastings, 6 CIR 317 (1982) and Local No. 831, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of North Platte, 6 CIR 1 (1982). Aff’d in part, and in part rev’d. 215 Neb. 89, 337 N.W.2d 716 (1983). A thorough analysis of each of the array cities proposed by the parties in this case is necessary to obtain a sufficient array.

Array decisions are made on a case-by-case basis from the evidence received. See General Drivers & Helpers Union Local No. 554 v. County of Gage, 14 CIR 170 (2003). An array decision does not control the proper array in future cases. See Lincoln Firefighters Ass’n Local 644 v. City of Lincoln, 12 CIR 211 (1996).

For example, in Lincoln Firefighters Ass’n, the Commission had rendered two prior wage and fringe benefit decisions between the parties to that proceeding. See Lincoln Firefighters Association, Local 644 v. City of Lincoln, 3 CIR 130 (1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 198 Neb. 174, 252 N.W.2d 607 (1977) and Lincoln Firefighters Association, Local 644 v. City of Lincoln, 8 CIR 31 (1985). The Commission found that the array of compared–to employers in each of those two cases was similar, but not identical. In Lincoln Firefighters Ass’n, the Commission determined that it was not required to use either of the previously used arrays in the present proceeding. The Commission stated:

The Court of Industrial Relations should not be compelled to compare the same school districts in every case that comes before it involving the same school districts. The ultimate question is whether, as a matter of fact, the school districts selected for comparison are sufficiently similar to the subject district to fulfill the requirements of section 48-818, R.R.S. 1943. If they are, then there is no room for complaint. We are not prepared to say that merely because one set of school districts was deemed adequate in one case, a different set of school districts would necessarily be inadequate in a different case, particularly where different evidence is adduced.

AFSCME, Local 2088 v. County of Douglas, 208 Neb. 511, 518, 304 N.W.2d 368, 373 (1981) (citing Crete Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Crete, 193 Neb. 245, 226 N.W.2d 752 (1975)).

Cincinnati, Ohio; Columbus, Ohio; and St. Louis, Missouri

The parties have stipulated that in the five agreed–upon cities of Des Moines, IA; Milwaukee, WI; St. Paul, MN; Madison, WI; and Lincoln, NE, the work, skills, and working conditions of bargaining unit employees are sufficiently similar to those employees at the proposed comparable array points to satisfy the standards set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-818. In addition to the five agreed–upon comparable cities, the Petitioner requests that Cincinnati, OH and Columbus, OH be included in the array selected by this Commission. The Petitioner seeks to include both Ohio cities in order to both achieve balance in the array between larger and smaller populated cities as compared to Omaha, and to establish an array of statistically significant proportions. The Respondent argues that the Ohio cities are not geographically proximate, the statistics represent dissimilar working conditions and the cities represent one labor market. The Respondent objects to the inclusion of Cincinnati, OH and Columbus, OH, and instead requests that St. Louis, MO be included in the array selected by the Commission. The Petitioner objects to the inclusion of St. Louis, MO in the array selected by the Commission.

The Commission previously included the City of Cincinnati in its array the last time these same parties were before this Commission. See Professional Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, 16 CIR 35 (2008). The Petitioner argues that there is no evidence in the record supporting the exclusion of Cincinnati, OH. However, we note that the burden of proof rests on the moving party to prove the inclusion of an array city. See Local No. 831, International Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of North Platte, 4 CIR 12 (1979).

As the Nebraska Supreme Court stated in Lincoln Fire Fighters Assn. v. City of Lincoln , 198 Neb. 174, 252 N.W.2d 607 (1977), “the burden is on the moving party in a Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-818 case to demonstrate that existing wages are not comparable to the prevalent wage rate...” Basically, it is necessary for the party requesting the inclusion of a particular array city to first establish by the evidence what were the prevalent wage rates paid, and conditions of employment maintained, for the same or similar work of workers exhibiting like or similar skills under the same or similar working conditions. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-818. In making this statutory comparison, the Court found it necessary to take into consideration not only the wage for time actually worked but also wages for time not worked, including vacations, holidays, and other excused time; all other benefits received including insurance and pensions; and the continuity and stability of employment. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that: “This was not done in this case as no evidence was presented on fringe benefits received by the firemen in those cities used for comparison.” Lincoln Fire Fighters Assn. v. City of Lincoln , supra.  See also, Crete Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Crete, 193 Neb. 245, 226 N.W.2d 752 (1975). These principals are applicable also in determining whether a party has sustained its burden of proof regarding proposed array cities. See International Association of Firefighters, Local Union No. 647 v. City of Grand Island, 15 CIR 324 (2007).

The Respondent argues that the Petitioner’s additional proposed array cities of Cincinnati, OH and Columbus, OH should be excluded because “it is unnecessary for the Commission to use a comparable that far separated from Omaha to get a sufficient array of comparable employers…” (Respondent’s Post-Hearing Brief, p.2.)

The Petitioner testified that, in choosing its array, it employed the concepts of geographic proximity, weather conditions, and whether the array city was cross–trained in ALS. Relying on a Supreme Court decision in Lincoln Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Lincoln, 198 Neb. 174, 252 N.W.2d 607 (1977), which affirmed the Commission’s previous selection of an array consisting of cities in the West North Central region to compare to the city of Lincoln, the Petitioner also used the concept of comparing Omaha to cities only within the West North Central region. Inclusion within the West North Central region alone does not make a city within the region comparable to Omaha. In sum, the Commission chooses the array cities which are sufficiently the same or similar. This is a determination of fact, and made from the evidence on a case–by–case basis. The Commission is not required to consider every possible array, but, seeks one which is sufficiently representative so as to determine whether the wages paid or benefits given are comparable. See Lincoln Co. Sheriff’s Emp. Ass’n v. County of Lincoln, 216 Neb. 274, 343 N.W. 2d 735 (1984).

In the 2008 Omaha Firefighters case quoted above, involving the same parties, the Commission disagreed with the Petitioner’s request to include Columbus, OH and the Respondent’s request that St. Louis, MO be included in the Commission’s selected array. This Commission remains convinced that the Petitioner’s requested Columbus, OH and the Respondent’s requested St. Louis, MO are properly excluded array cities.

With regard to Columbus, OH, the Respondent points out that Columbus staffing is more than double the size of Omaha’s Fire Department (1,481 uniformed employees as compared to 679 uniformed employees at Omaha). (Exhibit 2). Additionally, the Columbus Fire Department handles almost four times as many service calls compared to Omaha (146,144 total calls for service as compared to 38,849 calls for service in Omaha). (Exhibit 3).  Columbus is the farthest proposed array city from Omaha. (Exhibit 2). The evidence proves once again that there are substantial differences in the conditions of employment between Columbus and Omaha. We will not include Columbus, OH.

Likewise in this case, the Petitioner presented testimony again that the ALS services were administered very differently in St. Louis as compared to Omaha. St. Louis is still not requiring its employees to be dual–roled, cross–trained and a fully integrated fire department.  See also International Association of Firefighters, Local Union No. 647 v. City of Grand Island, 15 CIR 324 (2007). In the instant case, the two cities work in very different working conditions. In Omaha, roughly 73% of the total calls require the emergency medical function, performed by the dual–trained firefighters, whereas in St. Louis the separate division which performs the EMS function handles these calls. As in the previous Omaha Firefighters wage case in 2008, St. Louis still has a separate EMS service, the service is still in a separate bargaining unit, under separate direction and supervision, and those employees still are not required to be cross–trained as firefighters in St. Louis. The evidence in the instant case also demonstrates that while all firefighters in Omaha could do either the job of firefighter or paramedic in St. Louis, the vast majority of the firefighters in St. Louis are not qualified to perform the role of firefighter in Omaha. The evidence proves once again that there are substantial differences in the conditions of employment between St. Louis and Omaha. We will not include St. Louis.

The greater issue is whether Cincinnati should be included in the Commission’s selected array in the instant case. The Petitioner argues that the factors the Commission relied upon in the 2008 case have not changed in a general reference in Petitioner’s brief, although the Petitioner did not provide the Commission with testimony or exhibits to prove Cincinnati’s working conditions have remained unchanged. In fact, it appears from the record that both the Petitioner and the Respondent have relied upon the Commission’s 2008 array decision to include Cincinnati, as demonstrated by the detailed evidence introduced by the parties regarding working condition similarities and/or dissimilarities for St. Louis and Columbus but not for the array city of Cincinnati.

In support of its argument to include Cincinnati, the Petitioner relies on the opinion testimony of Omaha Fire Captain Loren Muschall, secretary of the Omaha firefighters’ union, regarding the similarity of work, skill, and working conditions. He testified that he went to Cincinnati and met with the president of the Cincinnati firefighters’ union and some of his officers. He testified that he observed the Cincinnati fire operations “through discussions with him” (the president of the Cincinnati firefighters’ union). Based upon his “observations” he gave his opinion that the fire work they were doing in Cincinnati was the same or similar work under the same or similar conditions to the work that he was doing in Omaha as a fire captain. There is no testimony regarding what he observed. Opinion evidence is evaluated largely on the facts on which the opinion is based. The opinion here does not merit much weight.  This evidence lacks important factors regarding the witness’s opportunity for seeing or knowing things about which the witness testified.

In the 2008 Omaha Firefighters case, we recognize that the Commission included Cincinnati in its array. Just over a year later it may seem incredulous that the Commission would be considering whether or not to include Cincinnati in the array. However, the law is well settled that in each case the party requesting the inclusion of a particular array member must prove the inclusion of that array city through the weight of the evidence presented in that case. Under stare decisis (the doctrine of precedent), the Commission must require the parties to consistently establish their array in each case. The Commission also determines what weight, if any, to give to opinion testimony, considering the source(s) of the expert’s information and any reasons given for any opinion expressed by the witness.

The Petitioner did not prove comparability in the instant case. The record lacks evidence regarding whether any working conditions have changed since 2008 have, or have not, changed. Exhibit 80, the Petitioner’s survey of Cincinnati does not present the Commission with convincing evidence for the inclusion of Cincinnati. In the taking of evidence, the rules of evidence, prevailing in the trial of civil cases in Nebraska are observed by the Commission. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-809. The Petitioner’s testimony lacks the weight necessary to meet Petitioner’s burden of proof in light of NJI2d Civ. 1.41. While the Respondent raised an objection on foundation to the inclusion of Exhibit 80, the objection was overruled because the Respondent also did not provide sufficient argument or evidence to exclude the exhibit. Nevertheless, it is the Petitioner’s burden to prove the inclusion of Cincinnati in the array. The Petitioner did not prove comparability in the instant case, failing to sustain its burden. Cincinnati will not be included in the Commission’s array.

Although small, with the agreed–to array of the five cities of Lincoln, NE; St. Paul, MN; Milwaukee, WI; Madison, WI; and Des Moines, IA, this Commission has a valid and sufficient expression of the relevant market. There is no need to go an even greater distance from Omaha than the five agreed–to cities to find valid comparators. The evidence shows that Cincinnati, OH is 626 miles from Omaha and Columbus, OH is 690 miles from Omaha. The Petitioner has failed to convince the Commission that the city of Cincinnati, Ohio should be included in the array. The Commission's array shall consist of only the five common array cities of Lincoln, NE; St. Paul, MN; Milwaukee, WI; Madison, WI; and Des Moines, IA agreed to by the parties.       

WAGES and STEPS:

Probationary Firefighter

            The Petitioner contends that a probationary wage is not prevalent in the market and argues the wage should be eliminated. The Respondent argues it is appropriate to calculate a separate market wage rate for probationary firefighters because they have separate conditions of employment.

Exhibit 324 confirms that the City of Madison has a probationary firefighter position and Exhibit 323 states that the probationary period lasts for 9 months. Exhibit 301 confirms that the City of Milwaukee has probationary firefighters. According to Exhibit 267, the City of Lincoln has a probationary firefighter position and the position lasts for the first 6 months of employment. St. Paul has a probationary firefighter that makes $12.81 according to Exhibit 286 and lasts 13 weeks.  Finally, Des Moines has a probationary pay rate lasting 12 months as seen in Exhibit 311. The Commission has not received evidence to determine the length of a probationary period for Milwaukee. Additionally, the Respondent’s expert witness also testified that all of the array cities have some type of probation, whether the array city paid the probationary firefighter at a starting wage rate (lower than the first step of the firefighter) or just placed the probationary firefighter on the first step of the firefighter pay structure. The evidence demonstrates that having a probationary firefighter is a clear prevalent amongst the array. A probationary firefighter has a different job description than any of the other surveyed jobs. We agree with the Respondent’s argument that it is appropriate to have a separate pay classification for probationary firefighters because the position is a separate job classification. The midpoint for probationary firefighter pay is $14.79. See Table 1.

Step Placement

The Petitioner requests that because placement on the pay line results in an overlap in ranks, some bargaining unit members who earn a promotion in the year in question earn less on the lowest step of the higher rank. The Petitioner seeks to eliminate the overlap between ranks by guaranteeing a minimum percentage increase (5%) when receiving a promotion. The Respondent asserts the practice of guaranteeing a 5% increase is not prevalent and the Petitioner did not provide competent evidence in the record to support its conclusion.

Based upon the array chosen, it is prevalent to place employees on the pay-line based upon a combination of time and performance under all four of the job classifications. See Tables 9 through 12. Drawing upon the performance evaluations of each firefighter, which are in the custody of the Respondent, the Respondent should place each officer on the pay-line using both time and performance since a combination of the two is the prevalent practice.  The Supreme Court in Douglas Cty. Health Dept. Emp Assn. v. Douglas Cty, 229 Neb. 30l, 427 N.W.2d 28 (l988) specifically held that the “manner in which an individual moves from the minimum to the maximum salary rate of a job classification is a timing difference in the salary schedule, which must be adjusted to reach a comparability determination” and is a condition of employment, which the Commission has statutory authority to establish. See also Plattsmouth Pol. Dept. Collective Bargaining v. Plattsmouth, 205 Neb. 567, 288 N.W.2d 729 (l980). Furthermore, in AFSCME v. City of Grand Island, 13 CIR 1 (1997), the Commission placed employees on the pay-line both by time of service and successful completion of performance evaluations.

We find that each employee should be placed on the appropriate new pay plan (Tables 9 –12) at a step for which each such employee has qualified by time in service as of the contract date, December 30, 2008, and the number of performance evaluations each employee has successfully completed to the date of the contract, whichever is the lesser number of steps. This placement on the new step pay plans gives credit to the employees for their time in service, and gives credit to each such employee for previously demonstrated job performance.

Now turning to the issue of promotional overlap, the Petitioner provided Omaha Municipal Code § 23-151, which requires the most approximate placement to a 5% pay increase upon promotion from one class to another. The Petitioner also suggests that Exhibits 55 indicates that it is prevalent to have a guaranteed percentage increase upon promotion because at each rank, promoted employees are receiving promotion to the next highest step in the new pay grade. The Petitioner further argues that this Exhibit provides sufficient foundational information for the Commission to order promotional placement within the market.  The Respondent argues that the Petitioner’s evidence fails to properly identify the prevalent practice in the market.

In the previous Omaha Firefighters case in 2008, the Commission was unable to determine the prevalent pay practice among the array members. The evidence provided in Exhibit 55 is confusing at best and does not clearly sort out the practice at each of the array cities. Without sufficient information, the Commission cannot determine the promotional issue. The current promotional practice in Omaha remains in effect.

FRINGE BENEFITS:

Pension Plan – Structural Changes

The Respondent proposes changes to the definitions such as modifying the current pension definition of base pay to exclude overtime, compensatory time and holiday time. The Respondent argues that these changes would reflect what is prevalent in the market. Alternatively, the Petitioner argues the Commission lacks the jurisdiction to amend the pension plan.

The Respondent concedes that the Supreme Court has indicated that the Commission has no authority to order certain structural changes to the pension plans for current employees; however the Respondent argues this case law does not prevent the Commission from ordering non-structural or definitional changes such as those requested above by the City. The Respondent argues that these are definitional changes as to the method of calculating the pension amount.  According to both Plattsmouth Police Dep’t Collective Bargaining Comm. v City of Plattsmouth, 205 Neb. 267, 288 N.W.2d 729 (1980) and General Drivers and Helpers Union, Local 554 v. County of Douglas, 13 CIR 202 (1999), we cannot amend the pension plan which includes how the parties arrive at the pension definition. We conclude such a change is actually structural, and which therefore is a change we cannot make, because we lack the necessary jurisdiction.

Pension Plan – Offset

The Respondent also requests that the Commission should order an offset based on its assertion that it overpaid retirement benefits to employees in the bargaining unit. The Petitioner argues that the Commission lacks sufficient evidence to determine an offset.

The pension plan is in the nature of a long–term contract which extends beyond the one–year period over which the Commission has jurisdiction in this case. The Commission has no general jurisdiction over contractual disputes. See Transport Workers of America v. Transit Auth. of City of Omaha, 205 Neb. 26, 286 N. W. 2d 102 and Professional Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, 16 CIR 35 (2008).

In Plattsmouth Police Dept. Collective Bargaining Committee v. City of Plattsmouth, 205 Neb. 567; 288 N.W.2d 729 (1980), the Nebraska Supreme Court, reversed the Commission in its decision ordering changes in the pension plan. The Commission in its decision ordered the City to amend its pension plan to provide a 12 percent or 6 and 6 pension plan. The Supreme Court concluded that the part of the order which directed the defendant to amend its pension plan was beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission.

Although the Commission does not have jurisdiction over the pension plan of the employees to order a change in the pension plan, the Commission does have jurisdiction to offset favorable and unfavorable comparisons of current to prevalent when reaching its decision establishing wage rates. Douglas Cty. Health Dept. Emp. Ass’n v. Douglas Cty., 229 Neb. 301, 422 N.W.2d 28 (1998).  The Commission, however, cannot offset pension contributions if such an adjustment rests on speculation, surmise, or conjecture. In Lincoln Firefighters Ass’n Local 644 v. City of Lincoln, 12 CIR 248 (1997), aff’d 253 Neb. 837 (1998), the Commission offset wages only after an actuary arrived at a theoretical cost of the benefits, equalizing the percentage of contributions.

In this case, an actuary called by Petitioner stated that from an actuarial standpoint, the pension contributions amounts could not be valued as benefits in order to make retirement plan comparisons.  The actuary testified that the contribution rate of the employer contemplates paying for both the normal cost for benefits as they are accruing and the past service liability which is amortized over time. The Petitioner argues that the array cities’ contribution rates were arrived at differently at each of the array cities and consequently the Commission is without proper and sufficient foundation to award an offset for contributions to the pension plan by the employer. The Petitioner argues the Respondent did not provide adequate foundation for the figures that go into calculating the necessary contribution rates. Accordingly, the Petitioner maintains the Respondent provided insufficient evidence for the Commission to determine “overall compensation” to order an offset because those contribution rates are designed to pay past service liability as well as the plan’s cost of currently accruing benefits.

With regard to the Respondents request for an offset, we note that the Commission has in the past the Commission has ordered an offset of pension benefits, which are above the prevalent, against wage increases. In this case, both experts acknowledge that we cannot rely simply upon the employer contribution rates in evidence. Although it appears that the Respondent is contributing at a higher rate than the array, we do not have the evidence upon which we could quantify that benefit without engaging in the speculation that we can simply rely on the contribution rates; which the testimony says we cannot. Since we are unable to accurately quantify the employer pension plan contributions disparities within the various array cities, we are unable to calculate an offset.

Retiree Benefits

            The Respondent requests the Commission to adjust the employer/employee contribution rates for all those hired after the date of the Commission’s decision and make the same definitional changes to Omaha’s pension plan structure to reflect the current market conditions. The Petitioner argues such a determination is moot.

In Lincoln Firefighters Ass’n, Local 644 v. City of Lincoln, 12 CIR 248, 266 (1997), the Commission refused to address insurance benefits for all non-bargaining unit members, namely retirees. The Respondent in this case suggests that we alter health insurance coverage offered to retirees from the year in dispute and forward.  For those employees retiring or retired in the current year in dispute, the Commission found in Lincoln Firefighters that those retirees were not in the bargaining unit and therefore the Commission could not address their benefits. Furthermore, any forward application of this year in dispute and for future years would be speculative and the Commission does not have jurisdiction to order elimination of health insurance benefits for retirees for future years. Therefore, the Commission will not determine this issue.

Staffing

            The Respondent requests the Commission to order that mandatory minimum daily staffing, staffing by rank and overall staffing requirements are management prerogatives. The Petitioner maintains that the staffing issue is moot by operation of the expiration of the contract year. The Petitioner also asserts that the Respondent’s arguments are not supported by the record. The Petitioner further asserts that staffing is primarily a firefighter safety issue and therefore is a mandatory subject of bargaining.

            Whether an issue is one for bargaining under the Industrial Relations Act depends upon whether it is primarily related to wages, hours, conditions of employment of the employees, or whether it is primarily related to formulation or management of public policy. While “terms and conditions of employment” have been given a broad and inclusive interpretation, a condition of employment should normally have an effect and an economic impact on the employee’s job assignment. Conditions of employment do not include certain subjects normally considered prerogatives of management. These include but are not limited to: business schedules, company policy, plant locations, or supervisors, because management decisions lie at the core of management control. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R. B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964). A condition of employment should normally have an effect and an economic impact on the employee’s job assignment. See Omaha Police Union Local 101, IUPA, AFL-CIO v. City of Omaha and Chief of Police, Thomas Warren and Mayor Michael Fahey, 15 CIR 292 (2007). Further, the distinction between conditions of employment and management prerogatives in the school setting was set forth in School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass’n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972) (school districts have management prerogatives with regard to: “The right to hire; to maintain order and efficiency; to schedule work; to control transfers and assignments; to determine what extracurricular activities may be supported or sponsored; and to determine the curriculum, class size, and types of specialists to be employed.”)

 Any staffing is primarily an issue of safety and is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Norfolk Education Ass’n v. School Dist. of Norfolk, 1 CIR 40 (1971) & (1973) (where the Commission quoted N.L.R.B. v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 56 LC 12, 258 (5^th Cir. 1967) by stating “company rules relating to safety and work practices are mandatory subjects for collective bargaining.”) However, staffing relating to scheduling work such as daily staffing and staffing by rank and overall staffing requirements are management prerogatives much like those in School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass’n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972).  The Commission does not have jurisdiction over management prerogatives. Nebraska Dept. of Roads Emp. Ass’n v. Dept. of Roads, 189 Neb. 754, 205 N.W.2d 110 (1973); IBEW v. City of Fairbury , 6 CIR 205 (1982). Therefore, because these particular staffing requirements are more closely related to the assignment of work, the Commission does not have the jurisdiction to order any change to daily staffing, staffing by rank, and overall staffing requirements.

Longevity Pay

            The Petitioner argues that longevity pay continues to be a benefit and zeros should not be counted in calculating longevity pay. The issue of whether to count zeros refers to whether those array cities that are found to not provide a particular benefit should be counted in the computation determining the average and then the midpoint of the benefit. The Petitioner requests the Commission to order increases or decreases to the midpoint where necessary. The Respondent argues that longevity is pay and not a benefit and for purposes of calculating accurate wage rates for the array cities, the Commission should use zeros in its calculation. The Respondent further suggests that the Commission must conclude that St. Paul pays higher wages because they do not pay any longevity pay.

The Commission has not included zeros in its calculation of longevity pay in the past. See Professional Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, 16 CIR 35 (2008) and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union 571 v. Cty. of Douglas, 15 CIR 203, 208 (2006).

As we state in the previous 2008 Omaha Firefighters, whether longevity is “pay” or a “benefit” is really an argument of semantics. The effect of longevity pay simply provides additional compensation for years of service without regard to performance. Longevity pay is “pay” that is bargained for as a “benefit” that may or may not be provided at a particular array city.  Additionally, the Commission cited Lincoln Firefighters Ass’n Local 664 v. City of Lincoln, 12 CIR 248 (1997), aff’d, 253 Neb. 837, 572 N.W.2d 369 (1998), stating that in this case the Commission found that comparability should be determined by eliminating the array employers which are not among the prevalent. The Commission opined that if a particular fringe benefit is not offered by a majority of the array of compared–to employers, then that benefit is eliminated. In doing so, the Commission reasoned that no value should be given for the fact that a minority of the array employers provide this benefit; or conversely, when a majority of the array employers provide a benefit, no value should be given for the minority of array employers which do not provide the benefit.

The Commission has frequently calculated fringe benefits in this manner. See also Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City of Omaha, 11 CIR 114 (1991); Nebraska Pub. Employees Local Union 251 v. Cty. of Douglas, 11 CIR 189 (1992); Neligh-Oakdale Educ. Ass’n v. Antelope County School Dist. 0009, 12 CIR 21 (1993); General Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 554 v. Robertson, 12 CIR 120 (1995).  We will first determine whether longevity pay or any other fringe benefit is prevalent among the array of compared–to employers, and then determine comparability among those providing the prevalent benefit.

With regard to the instant case, the Respondent argues that St. Paul does not provide longevity pay because it provides higher wages to its employees. We note in reviewing the evidence that the Respondent did not prove that the St. Paul has purposely chosen to not have longevity pay and instead placed those dollars into the daily pay rates in the various job classifications. Without convincing evidence, the Commission will not change its traditional proven method of calculating longevity pay. Therefore, the Commission will not include zeros in the table calculations.

Moot Fringe Benefits

            While the Commission is not deprived of jurisdiction to set wage rates after the end of the bargaining year in question, a dollar–for–dollar costing out of each benefit is not required where, as here, the contract year in dispute is already past, and the impossibility or impracticability of retroactively changing fringe benefits for an expired contract year is well recognized.  See Lincoln Firefighters v. City of Lincoln, 12 CIR 248 (1997), aff’d, 253 Neb. 837, 572 N.W.2d 369 (1998). The Commission determines that the following fringe benefits are moot because the year in dispute is over; see General Drivers & Helpers Union Local 554 v. County of Gage, et. al., 14 CIR 170 (2003):

1)      Funeral Leave

2)      Holidays (Hours Per Year)

3)      Holidays (Comp. Leave Bank)

4)      Personal Days

5)      Disability Plans

6)      Full Time Union Representative

7)      Union Business (Time Off , Leave Hours, and Forms of Union Leave)

8)      Vacation Bid System

9)               Paid Vacation Policies – Unused Vacation Can Be Converted To Cash Upon  Resignation, Dismissal, Retirement and Death.

10)  Fire Bunker Gear

11)  Annual Maintenance and Cleaning Allowance

12)  Replace Personal Items

13)  Turn Out Gear

14)  Uniform Provided

15)  Quartermaster System

16)            Overtime –Vacation Hours, Sick Leave Hours, and Compensatory Time Hours    not included in computation.

17)              Life Insurance Amount of Coverage.

18)              Health Insurance Major Medical – Provided.

19)              Health Insurance Maximum Benefit – Unlimited.

20)              Health Insurance Employee – Deductible Allowed.

21)              Health Insurance Single Deductible Amount – $150.

22)              Health Insurance Family Deductible Amount – $300.

23)              Health Insurance Stop-Loss – Provided.

24)              Health Insurance Percent Co-Pay – 90/10.

25)           Health Insurance Prescription Drug Plan – Provided and Generic/Brand.

26)              Health Insurance Plan Type.

27)              Health Insurance – Co-Insurance Amount.

28)  Vision Insurance.

29)  Dental Insurance – Employer Paid.

30)  Dental Insurance – Part of the Overall Health Insurance Premium.

31)  Holiday – Hours Per Year.

32)  Holiday Payout for Employees – Yes.

33)  Holiday Accumulation Holiday and Comp. leave Bank – No.

34)  Personal Days – No.

35)              Sick Leave – Hours Allowed Annually.

36)              Sick Leave Define Family.

37)              Sick Leave Converted to Cash Upon, Resignation, Dismissal, Retirement or Death.

38)              Union Dues Check-off

Benefits Not Considered

The Commission shall continue to determine comparability of health insurance and life insurance by comparing the percent of the premium to be paid by the employer and employee. See also Lincoln Firefighters Ass’n Local 644 v. City of Lincoln, 12 CIR 248, 265 (1997); General Drivers & Helpers Union Local 554 v. County of Gage, et. al., 14 CIR 170 (2003).

The following benefits will not be considered according to the above rule: 

       1)        Health Insurance Dollar Amounts.

        2)       Life Insurance Dollar Amounts.

        3)       Dental Insurance Dollar Amounts.

Comparable Fringe Benefits

The following fringe benefits received by the Omaha firefighters shall remain unchanged because they are comparable to those received by firefighters in the array:

1)      Pay Administration Firefighter/Senior Firefighter Steps – Provided. See Table 9.

2)      Pay Administration Firefighter/Senior Firefighter Years to Max and Movement – 7 and Performance and Time. See Table 9.

3)      Pay Administration Fire Apparatus Engineer Steps – Provided. See Table 10.

4)      Pay Administration Fire Apparatus Engineer Years to Max and Movement –Performance and Time. See Table 10.

5)      Pay Administration Fire Captain Steps – Provided. See Table 11.

6)      Pay Administration Fire Captain Years to Max and Movement – Performance and Time. See Table 11.

7)      Pay Administration Battalion Chief Steps – Provided. See Table 12.

8)      Pay Administration Battalion Chief Years to Max and Movement –7. See Table 12.

9)      Pay Administration Battalion Chief Movement – Performance and Time. See Table 12.

10)  Holidays – Regular Rate of Pay. See Table 13.

11)  Vacation Annual Accrual 24 Hour Employees – remained the same where appropriate. See Table 14.

12)  Vacation Annual Accrual Day Employees – remained the same where appropriate. See Table 15.

13)  Educational Assistance – Provided. See Table 16.

14)  Educational Assistance –100% Tuition. See Table 16.

15)  Call In Pay Hours Paid – 4. See Table 17.

16)  Call In Pay Rate of Pay – 1.5 times the regular rate. See Table 17.

17)  Uniform Allowance – Provided. See Table 18.

18)  Bank Compensatory Time –Yes. See Table 19.

19)  Life Insurance – Provided. See Table 21.

20)  Life Insurance Percentage Paid by Employer – 100%. See Table 21.

21)  Health Insurance Single – 100%. See Table 22.

22)  Sick Leave 8 – 10 Hour Employees – Maintain Hours Earned Per Year at 104. See Table 23.

23)   Sick Leave Maximum Accumulation of Hours for both 24 Hour Employees and        8 –10 Hour Employees- Unlimited. See Table 23.

24)  Sick Leave – Converted Annually to Cash – No. See Table 24.

25)  Sick Leave – Converted Annually to Vacation – No. See Table 24.

26)  Specialty Pay Not Provided – Arson Investigation, Bomb Disposal, Medical Unit Driver, High Angle Rescue, Swift Water Rescue, Dive Team Rescue, EMT I, EMT B and EMT A. See Table 25.

27)  Specialty Pay Provided at Same Rate  – 4% for Hazardous Materials Assigned, 2% for Hazardous Materials Not Assigned, and 10% EMT P Assigned. See Table 25.

28)  Injured on Duty Leave Provided. See Table 26.

29)  Injured on Duty Leave Maximum – 365 Days. See Table 26.

30)  Injured on Duty Leave How Compensated – 100% Salary for one year. See Table 26.

31)  Court Duty Minimum Hours – 3 hours. See Table 27.

32)  Court Duty Amount – 1.5 Times. See Table 27.

33)  Work-Out-Of Class Pay – Provided. See Table 28.

34)  Work-Out-Of Class Pay Hours – For all Hours Worked. See Table 28.

35)  Work-Out-Of Class Pay Rate – Rate of Higher Classification. See Table 28.

36)  Longevity Pay Plan – Provided. See Table 29.

37)  Longevity Pay Plan Years for Eligibility – 6. See Table 29.

38)  Overtime – Vacation Hours, Sick Leave Hours, and Compensatory Time Hours not included in computation. See Table 20.

Non-Comparable Benefits

The Commission finds the following fringe benefits to be non-comparable to the array cities, and orders the following adjustments:

1)      Pay Administration Firefighter/Senior Firefighter Number of Steps – Increased from 7 to 8. See Table 9.

2)      Pay Administration Fire Apparatus Engineer Number of Steps – Increased from 6 to 7. See Table 10.

3)      Pay Administration Fire Apparatus Engineer Years to Maximum – Decreased from 7 to 4. See Table 10.

4)      Pay Administration Fire Captain Number of Steps – Increased from 6 to 7. See Table 11.

5)      Pay Administration Fire Captain Years to Maximum – Decreased from 7 to 4. See Table 11.

6)      Pay Administration Battalion Chief Number of Steps – Increased from 6 to 9. See Table 12.

7)      Vacation Leave – Accumulation Not Allowed. See Table 30

8)      Vacation Annual Accrual 24 Hour Employees – increased and decreased where appropriate. See Table 14.

9)      Vacation Annual Accrual Day Employees – increased and decreased where appropriate. See Table 15.

10)  On-Call Pay – Now Provided at a Guaranteed Rate. See Table 31

11)  Uniform Allowance Annual Amount – Decreased from $461 to $417 per year. See Table 18

12)  Compensatory Time Hours – Decreased from 120 to 109 Hours. See Table 19.

13)  Health Insurance Family – Increased to 97%. See Table 22.

14)  Health Insurance 2/4 Party – Increased to 97%. See Table 22.

15)  Dental Insurance Premium Individual – Increased from 86% to 93%.  See Table 32.

16)  Dental Insurance Premium Family – Increased from 80% to 90%.  See Table 32.

17)  Sick Leave 24 Hour Employees – Increase Hours Earned Per Year from 148 to 152. See Table 23.

18)  Specialty Pay Provided at Different Rate – Decreased from 7% to 6% for EMT-P not assigned. See Table 25.

19)   Longevity Pay Firefighter/Senior Firefighter – Starting after Year 5, increased and decreased where necessary. See Table 33.

20)  Longevity Pay Fire Apparatus Engineer – Starting after Year 5, increased and decreased where necessary. See Table 34.

21)  Longevity Pay Fire Captain – Starting after Year 5, increased and decreased where necessary. See Table 35.

22)  Longevity Pay Battalion Fire Chief – Starting after Year 10, decreased where necessary. See Table 36.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that for the December 30, 2008 through December 28, 2009 contract year, the following shall be effective as of December 30, 2008:

1)  Petitioner’s wages for the December 30, 2008 through December 28, 2009 contract year shall be as follows:

JOB CLASSIFICATION                                      MIN                           MAX

Probationary Firefighter                                   $ 14.79

Firefighter/Senior Firefighter                           $ 15.99                       $ 21.12

Fire Apparatus Engineer                                 $ 18.58                        $22.34

Captain                                                              $ 21.31                       $ 25.76

Drill Master                                                        $ 23.70                        $ 28.65

EMS Shift Supervisor                                       $ 23.70                        $ 28.65

Assistant Fire Marshall                                     $ 25.62                        $ 31.46

Bataillon Fire Chief                                           $ 27.49                        $ 33.76

2)  The fringe benefit and wage offset, as found herein, shall be calculated on an individual employee basis. The Respondent shall determine the net lump sum overpayment or underpayment for the contract year for each employee. Any net lump sum underpayment for any employee shall be paid by the Respondent to each such employee; however, any employee reimbursement shall not exceed the amount of compensation owed to the employee from the Respondent.

3)  The Respondent shall maintain a step pay plan for Firefighter/Senior Firefighter but shall increase the number of steps from 7 to 8. The Respondent shall maintain 7 years to maximum and shall maintain movement on the pay plan with both performance and time.

4)  The Respondent shall maintain a step pay plan for Fire Apparatus Engineer but shall increase the number of steps from 6 to 7 and decrease the years to maximum from 7 to 4. The Respondent shall maintain movement on the pay plan with both performance and time.

5)  The Respondent shall maintain a step pay plan for Fire Captain but shall increase the number of steps from 6 to 7 and decrease the years to maximum from 7 to 4. The Respondent shall maintain movement on the pay plan with both performance and time.

6)  The Respondent shall maintain a step pay plan for Battalion Chief but shall increase the number of steps from 6 to 9. Due to the fact the parties did not provide sufficient comparables, the Respondent shall maintain the years to max at 7 for the Battalion Fire Chief. The Respondent shall maintain movement on the pay plan with both performance and time.

7) The Respondent shall maintain holiday pay at the regular pay rate.

8) The Respondent shall decrease annual vacation accrual for 24 Hour Employees as follows in year: 6 from 168 hours to 151 hours; 19 from 274 to 265 hours; shall maintain 143 hours in year 4; and shall increase annual vacation accrual for 24 hour employees in the following years: 1 from 135 hours to 143 hours; 2 from135 hours to 143 hours; 3 from 135 hours to 143 hours; 5 from 148 hours to 151 hours; 7 from 187 hours to 197 hours; 8 from 191 hours to 202 hours; 9 from 192 hours to 202 hours; 10 from 192 hours to 202 hours; 11 from 196 hours to 209 hours; 12 from 217 hours to 240 hours; 13 from 229 hours to 240 hours; 14 from 231 hours to 240 hours; 15 from 231 hours to 247 hours; 16 from 251 hours to 265 hours; 17 from 251 hours to 265 hours; 18 from 251 hours to 265 hours; 20 from 280 hours to 302 hours; 21 from 296 hours to 306 hours; 22 from 296 hours to 306 hours;  23 from 296 hours to 306 hours;  24 from 296 hours to 306 hours; 25 from 297 hours to 307 hours; 30 from 298 hours to 308 hours;  and for maximum from 298 hours to 308 hours .

9) The Respondent shall decrease annual vacation accrual for Day Employees as follows in year: 4 from 91 hours to 85 hours; 5 from 94 hours to 89 hours; 6 from 104 hours to 103 hours; 14 from 146 hours to 145 hours; 19 from 175 hours to 167 hours; shall maintain the 83 hours in years 1, 2 and 3; and shall increase annual vacation accrual for day employees in the following years: 7 from 119 to 121 hours; 8 from 121 hours to 123 hours; 9 from 122 hours to 123 hours; 10 from 122 hours to 123 hours; 11 from 127 hours to 130 hours; 12 from 142 hours to 145 hours; 13 from 142 hours to 145 hours; 15 from 159  hours to 160 hours; 16 from 162 hours to 163 hours; 17 from 162 hours to 163 hours; 18 from 162 hours to 163 hours; 20 from 193 hours to 195 hours; 21 from 195 hours to 198 hours; 22 from 195 hours to 198 hours; 23 from 195 hours to 198 hours; 24 from 195 hours to 198 hours; 25 from 198 hours to 199 hours; 30 from 198 hours to 198 hours and maximum from 198 hours to 199 hours.

10) The Respondent shall continue to provide educational assistance with 100% reimbursed for tuition.

11) The Respondent shall continue to pay 4 hours paid for call in pay at the rate of 1.5 times the regular pay rate.

12) The Respondent shall continue to provide a uniform allowance but decrease the annual amount from $461 to $417.

13) The Respondent shall continue to allow employees to bank compensatory time but should decrease the number of hours from 120 hours to 109 hours.

14) The Respondent shall continue to compute overtime by not counting vacation, sick leave, holidays, or compensatory time.

15) The Respondent shall continue to provide life insurance paid 100% by the Respondent.

16) The Respondent shall continue to pay 100% of individual health insurance. The Respondent shall increase the amount it pays for family coverage from 96% to 97% and 2-Party coverage from 96% to 97%.

17) The Respondent shall increase the sick leave hours earned per year for 24 hour employees from 148 hours to 152 hours and for 8-10 hours employees the Respondent shall maintain the rate of 104 hours earned per year. The maximum accumulation of hours shall remain unlimited.

18) The Respondent shall continue to not allow sick leave to annually be converted to cash or vacation.

19) The Respondent shall continue to not provide specialty pay for the positions of bomb disposal, arson investigator, medical unit driver, high angle rescue, swift water rescue, dive team rescue or EMT I, EMT B, or EMT A. The Respondent shall maintain paying 4% of Hazardous materials specialty pay that is assigned, paying 2% of hazardous materials not assigned and 10% of EMT P assigned. The Respondent should decrease its percentage of specialty pay from 7% to 6% for EMT P not assigned.

20) The Respondent shall continue to provide injury leave for a maximum number of 365 days at the rate of 100% salary for one year.

21) The Respondent shall continue to provide 3 minimum hours of court duty pay at the rate of 1.5 times the regular rate of pay.

22) The Respondent shall continue to provide working out of class pay for all hours worked at the rate of the higher classification.

23) The Respondent shall continue to have a longevity plan.

24) The Respondent shall discontinue the practice of allowing accumulation conversion of vacation.

25) The Respondent shall provide on-call pay at a guaranteed rate at an amount negotiated to by the parties because the result had no clear prevalence. See Table 31.

26) The Respondent shall continue to provide dental insurance but shall increase the rate paid of dental insurance from 86% for individuals to 93% for individuals and from 80% for family coverage to 90% for family coverage.

27) The Respondent shall start providing longevity pay after year 5 for the Firefighter/Senior Firefighter at the rate of $688. The Respondent shall increase the rate of longevity pay for the Firefighter/Senior Firefighter after years: 6 from $633 to $688; 7 from $663 to $688; decreasing in year 8 from $693 to $688; and then again increasing in year 9 from $693 to $917; and then again decreasing in year 10 from $1,011 to $970 ; and then again increasing in year 11 from $1,011 to $1,162; 12 from $1,011to $1,162; 13 from $1,011 to $1,290; 14 from  $1,164 to $1,500; 15 from $1,506 to $1,787; 16 from $1,556; 17 from $1,556 to $1,851; 18 from $1,659 to $2,062; 19 from $1,659 to $2,125; 20 from $2,091 to $2,361; 21 from $2,091 to $2,361; 22 from $2,144 to $2,571; 23 from $2,194 to $2,571; 24 from $2,194 to $2,644; 25 from $2,194 to $2,644; and maximum from $2,314 to $2,855.

28) The Respondent shall start providing longevity pay after year 5 for the Fire Apparatus Engineer at the rate of $722. The Respondent shall increase the rate of longevity pay for the Fire Apparatus Engineer after years: 6 from $696 to $722; 7 from $696 to $722; 8 from $714 to $722; 9 from $714 to $991; 10 from $1,032 to $1,205; 11 from $1,032 to $1,205; 12 from $1,032 to $1,205; 13 from $1,032 to $1,339; 14 from $1,192 to $1,561; 15 from $1,535 to $1,852; 16 from $1,587 to $1,852; 17 from $1,587 to $1,919; 18 from $1,695 to $2,141; 19 from $1,695 to $2,209; 20 from $2,130 to $2,444; 21 from $2,130 to $2,444; 22 from $2,186 to $2,666; 23 from $2,186 to $2,666 ; 24 from $2,186 to $2,666; 25 from $ 2,186 to $2,739; and maximum from $2,359 to $2,962.

29) The Respondent shall start providing longevity pay after year 5 for the Fire Captain at the rate of $808. The Respondent shall increase the rate of longevity pay for the Fire Captain after years: 6 from $745 to $808; 7 from $745 to $808; 8 from $746 to $808; 9 from $746 to $1,102; 10 from $1,069 to $1,310; 11 from $1,069 to $1,310; 12 from $1,069 to $1,310; 13 from $1,069 to $1,457; 14 from $1,243 to $1,713; 15 from $1,585 to 2,010; 16 from $1,643 to $2,010; 17 from $1,643 to $2,084; 18 from $1,760 $2,340; 19 from $1,760 to $2,413; 20 from $2,199 to $2,649; 21 from $2,199 to $2,649; 22 from $2,259 to $2,905; 23 from $2,259 to $2,905; 24 from $2,259 to $2,905; 25 from $2,436 to $2,978; and maximum from $2,436 to $3,234.

30) The Respondent shall continue to provide longevity pay after year 10 for the Battalion Fire Chief at the rate of $2,130 (from $1,542), eliminating the practice of paying longevity pay in the amount of $1,589 after year 7. The Respondent shall increase the rate of longevity pay after year 11 from $1,542 to $2,130; 12 from $1,542 to $2,130; 13 from $1,542 to $2,397: 14 from $2,065 to $2,990; 15 from $2,133 to $3,173; 16 from $2,234 to $3,173; 17 from $2,234 to $ 3,307; 18 from $2,656 to $3,900; 19 from $2,656 to $4,3034; 20 from $2,950 to $4,084; 21 from  $2,950 to $4,084; 22 from $3,273 to $4,677; 23 from $3,273 to $4,677; 24 from $3,273 to $4,811; 25 from $3,597 to $4,861; and maximum from $3,597 to $5,504

31) Any adjustments in compensation resulting from the final order rendered in this matter will be made by lump sum payment within 90 days of the Final Order.

All other terms and conditions of employment are not affected by this Order.

Commissioners Orr, Blake and Lindahl join in the entry of this order. Commissioner Burger dissents.

G. Peter Burger, Dissenting:

I was satisfied that the evidence supported the inclusion of Cincinnati in the array.  For this reason, I dissent.

To request copies of the Tables, call (402) 471-2934 or e-mail your request to industrial.relations@nebraska.gov