13 CIR 361 (2001) Affirmed in part, and in part reversed. 265 Neb. 8, 654 N.W.2d 166 (2002).


an Unincorporated Association, )
                                        Petitioner, )
                    v. ) DECISION AND ORDER
NO. 76-0002, A/K/A CRETE PUBLIC )
SCHOOLS, a Political Subdivision of the )
State of Nebraska, )
                                       Respondent )


For the Petitioner: Mark D. McGuire
McGuire and Norby
604 S. 14th Street
Suite 100
Lincoln, NE  68508
For the Respondent: Kelley Baker
Harding, Shultz & Downs
800 Lincoln Square
121 S. 13th Street
P. O. Box 82028
Lincoln, NE  68508

Before: Judges Anderson, Orr, and Council.



Crete Education Association (the APetitioner@ or AAssociation@) filed a Petition on November 16, 2000 with the Commission of Industrial Relations (the ACommission@) alleging that Saline County School District No. 76-0002, a/k/a Crete Public Schools (the ARespondent@ or ADistrict@) committed prohibited practices in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. '' 48-824(2)(a), (e), and (f) (Reissue 1998) by directly dealing with a bargaining unit member regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining and paying the bargaining unit member a Asigning bonus@ above his negotiated-for salary. Specifically, the Association claimed that the District hired a new teacher, Matthew Hintz, and, without bargaining with the Association, promised the teacher that he would be paid $24,000 for each of the 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 contract years. This annual salary is $2,350 above the annual salary that Mr. Hintz would receive under the terms of the 2000-2001 collective bargaining agreement.

In its Answer, the District asserts, AThe Board of Education made it clear to Association negotiators that it would pay Mr. Hintz no less than $24,000 for the 2000-2001 school year, that it had to do so to secure his employment, and that it would pay the amount needed to secure the services of new teachers when doing so was necessary to hire qualified teachers in areas that were difficult to fill. Association representatives expressed their disagreement with the Board of Education=s proposal, but acquiesced to it and waived any objection to it.@ Additionally, the District claims that the Petitioner waived objection to Mr. Hintz=s compensation by failing to file a grievance as allowed in the negotiated agreement, and that the Commission lacks authority to enjoin the District or its Board of Education as requested in Petitioner=s prayer for relief.

Trial was held on February 1, 2001 and the briefing schedule was completed on March 14, 2001.

The Commission, upon consideration of the testimony of witnesses and Exhibits in evidence, finds that the District committed prohibited practices in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. '' 48-824(2)(a), (e) and (f).


The Commission finds the following facts to be true. The Petitioner has been the certified exclusive bargaining representative for the District=s teachers for nearly twenty years, since 1981.

On or about March 9, 2000, the Association requested negotiations with the Board of Education regarding teachers= terms and conditions of employment for the 2000-2001 school year. The Board agreed to negotiate, but negotiations did not immediately commence.

Meanwhile, the District was recruiting an Industrial Technology teacher. The response to the District=s advertisements was small. After one month of advertising, only five or six applications were received. Of these applicants, only three were deemed suitable for consideration. One of the remaining three withdrew, leaving two applicants. The District then determined that only applicant Matthew Hintz would be acceptable. Mr. Hintz refused to take the position for less than $24,000. On April 4, 2000, the District agreed to hire Mr. Hintz and to pay him the salary of $24,000. The Board approved this hiring on April 10, 2000 without mention of the salary amount in the minutes of the board meeting. When the employment contract was signed the salary amount was left blank. Mr. Hintz executed this contract on April 19, 2000. The negotiated agreement for 1999-2000 contained a base salary of $21,000.

On April 19, 2000, the Association and District commenced the first negotiation session for the 2000-2001 contract year. During this session the Association raised new teacher contracts as a concern. The Board responded by informing the Association that $24,000 was promised to Mr. Hintz, but the amount in his contract was left blank.

The parties met for a total of five negotiating sessions from April 19 to August 8, 2000. Over the course of negotiations, the Association presented six different collective bargaining agreement proposals, and the Board presented seven. None of the offers included signing bonuses or special salaries for newly hired teachers. The proposals contained various salary schedules and base salaries, and the District expressed its desire to have base salaries high enough to attract new teachers. The District=s first two (2) offers included a base salary of $24,000, a package increase of 6.7%, an addition of $100,000, and a 3 x 4 salary schedule index. Each of the District=s first six (6) offers included effective base salaries near $24,000. The Association did not accept any of these offers and expressed its desire to keep the current 5 x 4 salary schedule index, which reflected a percentage increase vertically and horizontally across the salary schedule.

During negotiations, Mike Coe, an Association representative, informed the Board that he knew of no law or Board policy which would prevent the Board from giving teachers bonuses, but that the Association=s negotiation team did not endorse or approve bonuses. The District then presented its seventh proposal with a base salary of $21,650 on a 5 x 4 salary schedule. The parties completed negotiations without reaching impasse and without impasse being declared when the Association accepted this proposal, and the parties signed the 2000-2001 collective bargaining agreement on August 14, 2000 (the ANegotiated Agreement@).

The Negotiated Agreement includes a 5 x 4 salary schedule with a base salary of $21,650, which represents a 5.5% package increase over the 1999-2000 collective bargaining agreement. There is no reference in the Negotiated Agreement to signing bonuses.

After the collective bargaining agreement was completed, in late August, the District filled in A$21,650" as Mr. Hintz=s salary amount on his employment contract. On August 30, 2000 the District agreed to pay Mr. Hintz an additional $2,350 as a Asigning bonus@ in twelve (12) monthly installments to total $24,000 in compensation annually. Additionally, the District has agreed with Mr. Hintz that if employed by the District for the 2001-2002 school year, his salary will be no less than $24,000. The District currently pays Mr. Hintz the Asigning bonus@ as agreed.


The Association asserts that the District has violated Neb. Rev. Stat. '' 48-824(2)(a), (e), and (f). These sections provide:

(2) It is a prohibited practice for any employer or the employer=s negotiator to:

(a) Interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights granted by the Industrial Relations Act; . . .

(e) Refuse to negotiate collectively with representatives of collective-bargaining agents as required by the Industrial Relations Act;

(f) Deny the rights accompanying certification or recognition granted by the Industrial Relations Act. . .

The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated, A[D]ecisions under the NLRB [National Labor Relations Board] are helpful where there are similar provisions under the Nebraska statutes.@ Nebraska Public Employees Local Union 251 v. Otoe County, 257 Neb. 50, 63, 595 N.W.2d 237, 250 (1999)(quoting University Police Officers Union v. University of Neb., 203 Neb. 4, 12, 277 N.W.2d 529, 535 (1979)).

The National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. '' 151 et seq. (1994), ANLRA@) contains provisions similar to (2)(a) and (e), but the NLRA statute does not contain a provision similar to (f). Section 8(a) of the NLRA states in part, AIt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. . .(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).@ Section 9(a) provides that majority-selected representatives shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representatives regarding terms and conditions of employment. Similarly, Neb. Rev. Stat. ' 48-838(4) states that A[a] certified exclusive collective-bargaining agent shall represent all employees in the appropriate unit with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. . .@

The Nebraska Industrial Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act are similar. Thus federal decisions interpreting '' 8(a)(1) and (5) are helpful as guidance in interpreting '' 48-824(2)(a) and (e).

Direct Dealing:

The United States Supreme Court has long held that bypassing a certified or recognized collective bargaining agent and dealing directly with a represented employee concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining, such as wages and other terms and conditions of employment, violates '' 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). Good-faith bargaining requires, Aat a minimum[,] recognition that the statutory representative is the one with whom [the employer] must deal in conducting negotiations, and that it can no longer bargain directly or indirectly with employees.@ General Elec. Co., 150 NLRB 192, 194 (1964), enforced 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 965 (1970). As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, direct dealing is Ainherently divisive@ and has the effect of Aundermining the authority of the . . . bargaining representatives.@ General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d at 755.

In J.I. Case, the United States Supreme Court held that individual contracts entered into while no bargaining agent represented employees did not provide a defense for the employer=s refusal to bargain once a bargaining agent was certified. The Court held, AWherever private contracts conflict with [the NLRB=s] functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility.@ J.I. Case, 321 U.S. at 337. While J.I. Case dealt with individual contracts that were less beneficial than the collective agreement, the Court also addressed individual contracts that are more beneficial than collective ones. The Court stated:

[I]t is urged that some employees may lose by the collective agreement, that an individual workman may sometimes have, or be capable of getting, better terms than those obtainable by the group and that his freedom to contract must be respected on that account. We are not called upon to say that under no circumstances can an individual enforce an agreement more advantageous than a collective agreement, but we find the mere possibility that such agreements might be made no ground for holding generally that individual contracts may survive or surmount collective ones. The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages. Of course, where there is great variation in circumstances of employment or capacity of employees, it is possible for the collective bargain to prescribe only minimum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave certain areas open to individual bargaining. But except as so provided, advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as disadvantages. They are a fruitful way of interfering with organization and choice of representatives; increased compensation, if individually deserved, is often earned at the cost of breaking down some other standard thought to be for the welfare of the group, and always creates the suspicion of being paid at the long-range expense of the group as a whole. Such discriminations not infrequently amount to unfair labor practices. The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more than that of the group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result. We cannot except individual contracts generally from the operation of collective ones because some may be more individually advantageous. Individual contracts cannot subtract from collective ones, and whether under some circumstances they may add to them in matters covered by the collective bargain, we leave to be determined by appropriate forums under the laws of contracts applicable, and to the Labor Board if they constitute unfair labor practices.

Id. at 338-39 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, under the National Labor Relations Act, ' 8(a) (1,5) as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. ' 158 (a) (1,5), a bonus is a mandatory subject for a collective bargaining agreement. Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 401 F.2d 366 (C.A. Ohio 1968). "[C]ourts have rather consistently held that such items as overtime pay, extra duty pay, vacation and holiday pay, bonus or merit pay, severance pay, shift differentials, and pensions are mandatory subjects of bargaining encompassed within the term 'wages.' " Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, in Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, at 88 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) (footnotes omitted); see Beacon Journal Pub. Co., 401 F.2d at 367 (a Christmas bonus is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining even though employer gives it as a purely voluntary and discretionary act). A bonus paid directly to any employee within a collective bargaining unit is within the term "wages" and is therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining. Such a bonus must be agreed upon in a collective bargaining agreement.

The NLRB uses the following criteria to determine whether illegal direct dealing has occurred: (1) the employer communicated directly with its union-represented employees; (2) the communication was for the purpose of establishing or changing the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment or undercutting the union=s role in bargaining; and, (3) such communication was to the exclusion of the union. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 316 NLRB 979 (1995); Permanente Medical Group, 332 NLRB No. 106 (Oct. 31, 2000).

In the current case, the District met with Mr. Hintz and communicated with him directly for the purpose of establishing his wages. This communication was to the exclusion of the Association; the Association had absolutely no input before the District and Mr. Hintz agreed to a salary of $24,000 per year. After the collective bargaining agreement was entered, the District again met with Mr. Hintz on August 30, 2000 to set forth in writing that his annual compensation would total $24,000, including a Asigning bonus@ of $2,350 that the Association had stated it specifically disapproved during negotiations. These direct communications undercut the Association=s role in bargaining and are a prohibited practice in violation of '' 48-824(2)(a) and (e).

Additionally, the District=s direct dealing is a violation of ' 48-824(2)(f). As stated previously, this section provides that it is a prohibited practice for an employer to deny rights accompanying certification or recognition granted by the Industrial Relations Act. One right that the Act grants to the Association as the certified representative for the teachers is the right of exclusivity. The principle of exclusive representation fosters stability in collective bargaining relationships by discouraging splintered employee factions and protecting the bargaining representative=s interest in presenting a united front. See, Permanente, 332 NLRB No. 106 (Member Fox, dissenting)(citing, Medo, 321 U.S. at 683-685; Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975)).

The District directly dealt with Mr. Hintz regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining, thereby bypassing the Association and undermining its status as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of bargaining unit employees. These acts violated '' 48-824(2)(a), (e), and (f).

Unilateral Implementation:

Just as direct dealing is a violation of the employer=s duty to bargain in good faith with the employees= exclusive representative, an employer=s unilateral implementation of a term or condition of employment contrary to the collective bargaining agreement may also be a violation of that duty. See, F.O.P. Lodge 41 v. County of Scotts Bluff, 13 CIR 270 (2000)(en banc).

The District knew that it could not establish Mr. Hintz=s salary at an amount contrary to the 2000-2001 collective bargaining agreement. This is evidenced by the District leaving Mr. Hintz=s contracted-for salary amount blank on April 10, 2000 and filling it in at $21,650 after negotiations concluded in August. Despite adhering to the agreement on the surface by filling in $21,650 as Mr. Hintz=s salary, the District entered a supplemental agreement on August 30, 2000 to pay Mr. Hintz a Asigning bonus@ in twelve monthly installments. This is the District=s way of fulfilling its original promise to Mr. Hintz that he be paid a $24,000 salary. Whether the extra $2,350 is labeled a signing bonus or salary, it is not provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. It is an amount that is being unilaterally paid without the Association=s consent and without having reached good-faith impasse. We therefore find that the District=s payment of $24,000 in annual compensation to Mr. Hintz is a violation of '' 48-824(2)(a) and (e) independent from the District=s direct dealing violations.


The District asserts that the Association waived its right to object to the payment because it did not file a grievance under Article IX and Appendix D of the 2000-2001 Negotiated Agreement and because Mr. Coe, the Association=s chief negotiator, told the District that he knew of no law or board policy that prevents the board from paying bonuses even though the Association did not endorse or approve of bonuses.

First, there is nothing in the Negotiated Agreement that waives the Association=s statutory right to litigate their claim. A waiver of a statutory right must be clear and unmistakable. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). The Nebraska Supreme Court in Shelter Ins. Companies v. Frohlich, 243 Neb. 111, 498 N.W.2d 74 (1993), stated that Awaiver@ is voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, privilege, or claim and may be inferred from a person=s conduct. Frohlich, 498 N.W.2d at 83. The Court further concluded that in order to establish waiver of a legal right, there must be clear, unequivocal, and decisive action of a party showing such purpose, or acts amounting to estoppel on his part. Frohlich, 498 N.W.2d at 83; Schoemaker v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 245 Neb. 967, 515 N.W.2d 675 (1994). The grievance procedure provides that if a grievance is not filed within 30 days after the grievant has knowledge of the alleged wrongful act, then the grievance shall be waived. This, however, does not specifically waive the statutory right to bring a case before the Commission. The Association has a statutory right to file a prohibited practice case, and its non-filing of a grievance does not waive that right. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. ' 48-810 (Aindustrial disputes. . . shall be settled by invoking the jurisdiction of the Commission of Industrial Relations.@). There is no unequivocal relinquishment of this right in the Negotiated Agreement.

The District=s argument that Mr. Coe=s statement somehow waived the Association=s right to file this case must also fail. Again, waiver of a statutory right must be clear and unmistakable. Id. Parol evidence will not be permitted to alter the plain terms of unambiguous contract language. Sac Bros v. TriValley Co-op, Inc, 260 Neb. 312, 616 N.W.2d 786 (2000). We find the terms of the Negotiated Agreement to be unambiguous. Article II of the Negotiated Agreement deals with salary referring to the Salary Schedule, Appendix A. Article III deals with Extra-Duty pay referring to the Appendices B and C. There is no authority in the agreement for paying compensation not provided in these appendices. There is no reference to a signing bonus. The parties carefully exchanged written drafts of their proposals and reduced their agreement to a comprehensive writing. If the parties had intended there to be a waiver of important statutory rights, they would not have excluded it from the carefully drafted written agreement. We will not permit parol evidence to alter the Negotiated Agreement.

The Association also did not commit any acts amounting to estoppel on its part. Six elements must be satisfied for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply. See Woodard v. City of Lincoln, 256 Neb. 61, 588 N.W.2d 831 (1999). In State v. Nebraska Ass=n of Public Employees, 239 Neb. 653, 477 N.W.2d 577 (1991), the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the six elements of equitable estoppel are as follows: (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts; as to the other party; (4) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (5) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (6) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice. Nebraska Ass=n of Public Employees, 477 N.W.2d at 582.

 The Respondent argues prior to the signing of the Negotiated Agreement the Association=s representative made representations regarding the payment of signing bonuses. The record reveals that there were no false representations or concealment of material facts on the part of the Association. On the contrary, the Association in negotiations with the District clearly stated that while the Association=s representative could find no board policy which prevented the district from giving a bonus, the Association did not endorse or approve of such bonuses. We find no evidence in the record that this representation was false, nor do we find that the Association tried to conceal any policy. In addition, both parties had full knowledge of the law and policies of the District. In this lengthy negotiation process, the District cannot reasonably and in good faith rely upon a representation of law made by the Association without fully investigating that representation. We find that the District had the ability to learn and know the law and its own polices. Therefore, the elements of equitable estoppel 1, 4, and 5 above are not satisfied. It is unnecessary for us to discuss the remaining elements of equitable estoppel.

Furthermore, the rule against parole evidence prevents our modification of the unambiguous terms of the Negotiated Agreement. If the parties had intended the signing bonuses to be included in the Negotiated Agreement, they would have included them in the carefully written agreement. Parol evidence will not be used to alter the clear terms of the written agreement.

As the Commission said in Ewing Education Association v. Holt County School District No. 029, 12 CIR 242, 246 (1996) AWe believe that Neb. Rev. Stat.' 48-824 et. seq. was promulgated to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process. In the instant case, the District=s action subverts the Act=s principle objective B the establishment of terms and conditions of employment through the collective bargaining process. As such it is a prohibited practice under Neb. Rev. Stat. ' 48-824 (2)(a) and (f).@ Id at 246. The same is true for the Respondent=s payment of a Asigning bonus@ in this case.

In reaching our conclusion, we are not unmindful of the frustration that the Respondent and its board members may have felt in negotiating with Petitioner. Prior to the negotiations it had agreed to pay Mr. Hintz an annual salary of $24,000. Respondent began negotiations with the goal of increasing the base salary for all teachers to $24,000 to be competitive with comparable neighboring school districts. It was offering to add an additional $100,000 from its fiscal reserves to give a package increase of 6.75% from the previous year. Yet the Petitioner began negotiations demanding a base salary $1,800 less than Respondent was offering. Petitioner was ultimately successful in reaching a final agreement which reduced the base salary to $21,650 and the overall pay package to an increase of 5.5%. The Respondent=s negotiating goals of reaching a competitive salary for beginning teachers and meeting the commitment to Mr. Hintz were not satisfied in the Negotiated Agreement. But this frustration is no excuse for Respondent=s failure to honor the terms of the Negotiated Agreement that it had just signed.

Remedial Authority:

Finally, the District asserts in its Answer that the Commission lacks authority to enjoin the District as requested in the Petition. The Petition requests:

That the Commission enjoin the School District and its Board of Education from future deviations from the Negotiated Agreement and the index salary schedule included therein pertaining to salaries and fringe benefits; and that the School District and its Board of Education be required to post notices in conspicuous places in the school system not less than sixty (60) days acknowledging its violation of the Nebraska Industrial Relations Act, agreeing to avoid future violations of the Act, and for such additional and further relief as the Commission deems just.

Petition, & B, p. 5.

The statutes outlined below provide the authority to the Commission to fashion a remedy in industrial disputes..

Section 48-816(1) provides in pertinent part:

In the event of an industrial dispute between an employer and an employee or a labor organization when such employer and employee or labor organization have failed or refused to bargain in good faith concerning the matters in dispute, the commission may make any such order or orders as may be appropriate to govern the situation pending such bargaining. The Commission shall require good faith bargaining concerning the terms and conditions of employment of its employees by any employer.

(emphasis added)

Section 48-819.01 states:

Whenever it is alleged that a party to an industrial dispute has engaged in an act which is in violation of any of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, or which interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of the rights provided in such act, the commission shall have the power and authority to make such findings and to enter such temporary or permanent orders as the commission may find necessary to provide adequate remedies to the injured party or parties, to effectuate the public policy enunciated in section 48-802, and to resolve the dispute.

(emphasis added)

Section 48-823 provides:

The Industrial Relations Act and all grants of power, authority, and jurisdiction made in such act to the commission shall be liberally construed to effectuate the public policy enunciated in section 48-802. All incidental powers necessary to carry into effect the Industrial Relations Act are hereby granted to and conferred upon the commission.

(emphasis added)

As we said in analyzing the question of remedial authority in the Scotts Bluff opinion,

The Commission has the authority under the plain language of the statute to issue cease and desist orders following findings of prohibited practices and has done so in the past. In Ewing Educ. Ass=n v. Holt Co. School Dist. No. 29, 12 CIR 242 (1996)(en banc), the Commission found that the school district committed a prohibited practice when it unilaterally changed a condition of employment contained in a collective bargaining agreement. After entering into a collective bargaining agreement, the school district unilaterally changed the bargaining unit=s health insurance options. As a remedy, the Commission ordered the school district to cease and desist from charging insurance fees, to reimburse the fees withheld, and to post a notice to employees promising not to commit the same prohibited practices... The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commission=s remedial authority broadly. In IAFF Local 831 c. City of North Platte, 215 Neb. 89, 337 N.W.2d 716 (1983), the Court upheld the Commission=s award of interest against a party who had bargained in bad faith. The Court held that ' 48-819.01 provided the Commission=s authority to award interest even though it does not specifically mention awarding interest.

13 CIR at 291-92.

The Supreme Court has also approved the Commission=s authority to enter cease and desist orders in Transport Workers v. Transit Authority of Omaha, 216 Neb. 455, 344 N.W.2d 459 (1984), where it held that the Commission has the authority to issue status quo orders under '' 48-816 and 48-819.01. The Court concluded that "[t]o hold otherwise would be to completely repeal '' 48-816 and 48-819.01 by judicial fiat." Id. at 460.

Finally, according to ' 48-825(2), AIf the commission finds that the party accused has committed a prohibited practice, the commission, within thirty days after its decision, shall order an appropriate remedy. Any party may petition the district court for injunctive relief pursuant to the rules of civil procedure.@

In Scotts Bluff, 13 CIR at 289, after a thorough study of Commission and Nebraska Supreme Court cases discussing authority for remedies for a prohibited practice case, we stated: AThe Commission has the authority to order an appropriate remedy which will promote public policy, adequately provide relief to the injured party, and lead to the resolution of the industrial dispute.@ We adhere to that view.

The Respondent claims that the Legislature provided for injunctive relief to come from the district court rather than the Commission. The Commission, however, rejects this argument. The statute provides for injunctive relief to be sought in district court if enforcement of the Commission=s remedy is necessary. See generally, University Police Officers Union v. University of Neb., 203 Neb. 4, 277 N.W.2d 529 (1979) (holding that only the district courts may enforce Commission orders); IBEW Local 763 v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 209 Neb. 335, 307 N.W.2d 795 (1981) (holding that Commission orders establish the parties= rights, but suits to enforce those rights must be brought in district court).

We find that a cease and desist order is the appropriate remedy for this violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. '' 48-824(a)(e)(f). However, Mr. Hintz would be unnecessarily harmed if his agreement with the Respondent for the 2000-2001 term were not honored. Therefore, the order shall not become effective until after August 1, 2001.


The Respondent shall cease and desist from deviating from the Negotiated Agreement in payment of salaries and benefits.

The Respondent shall cease and desist from paying Matthew Hintz in deviation from the Negotiated Agreement after August 1, 2001.

The Respondent shall cease and desist from bypassing the Association and dealing directly with its represented employees regarding wages, terms, and conditions of employment.

The Respondent shall not pay teachers >signing bonuses= or other compensation that is a mandatory subject of bargaining and is not included in a Negotiated Agreement.

The Respondent shall place in a conspicuous place in the District=s school buildings the Notice which is attached hereto and made a part hereof by this reference. Said Notice shall be posted within ten (10) days of the entry of this order and remain posted for not less than sixty (60) consecutive contract days.

All panel judges join in the entry of this order

Issued May 1, 2001.





WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights granted by the Nebraska Industrial Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally modify the terms and conditions of the Negotiated Agreement this School District has entered into with the Crete Education Association without first bargaining any such modifications with the Association and if an understanding is reached as to any such modifications that the same will be reduced to writing.
WE WILL NOT deal directly with employees who are represented by the Crete Education Association as their collective bargaining agent with respect to terms and conditions of employment that are mandatory topics of collective bargaining and/or which are contained in the Negotiated Agreement between the Crete Education Association and the School District.

Dated _____________________ By ____________________________
(Representative) (Title)